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The Very Proper Gander1 
 
Not so very long ago there was a very fine gander. He was strong and smooth and 
beautiful and he spent most of his time singing to his wife and children. One day somebody 
who saw him strutting up and down in his yard and singing remarked, ‘There is a very 
proper gander.’ An old hen overheard this and told her husband about it that night in the 
roost. ‘They said something about propaganda’, she said. ‘I have always suspected that,’ 
said the rooster, and he went around the barnyard next day telling everybody that the very 
fine gander was a dangerous bird, more than likely a hawk in gander’s clothing. A small 
brown hen remembered a time when at a great distance she had seen the gander talking with 
some hawks in the forest. ‘They were up to no good,’ she said. A duck remembered that the 
gander had once told him he did not believe in anything. ‘He said to hell with the flag, too,’ 
said the duck. A guinea hen recalled that she had once seen somebody who looked very 
much like the gander throw something that looked a great deal like a bomb. Finally 
everybody snatched up sticks and stones and descended on the gander’s house. He was 
strutting in his front yard, singing to his children and his wife. ‘There he is!’ everybody 
cried. ‘Hawk-lover! Unbeliever! Flag-hater! Bomb-thrower!’ So they set upon him and 
drove him out of the country [...]. 
                                                     
1
 Thurber, James, Fables for Our Time [1940]. London, 1951 (Reprint 1993), p. 13. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Propaganda’ is a word which inflames passions. Public opinion often associates it 
with lies, distortion, deceit, manipulation, political control and psychological warfare. Yet 
this is view is biased. The technical term ‘propaganda’ as such is neutral and means to 
promote certain ideas (propaganda is the gerund nominative neuter plural of the Latin verb 
propagare and means ‘things to be spread’). It had its origins in 1622, when Pope Gregory 
XV founded the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, which was charged with 
promoting the faith in the Catholic Church and countering the Protestant revolution.2 But 
usage has imposed a negative meaning on the term. The association of propaganda with 
warfare is a consequence of the First World War, when highly sophisticated propaganda was 
employed systematically for the first time. Although spreading propaganda is not a 
specifically belligerent activity, it has been used most intensively in times of political and 
military conflict by the opposing parties.3 
But before examining the use of propaganda in war it is important to define its general 
meaning and the way it works. In social science propaganda is understood as ‘the deliberate 
and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to 
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.’4  
In considering how propaganda works we have to bear in mind that propaganda in its 
fundamental structure is a special form of communication. Its purpose is to make an 
audience believe or do certain things. Communication, in turn, is one of the basic elements 
of any society. When we communicate we try to find ‘common ground’ with someone, that 
is, to share information, an idea, or an attitude. Communication may take place between 
                                                     
2
 Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 15, 48; Hundhausen 1975, p. 92; Thomson 1977, p. 3. 
3
 Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 118-20. 
 8 
individuals, groups or social systems; as face-to-face interaction, or indirectly through a 
medium.5 Among modern communication theories Wilbur Schramm’s model is particularly 
useful for understanding how propaganda works. On the basis of this model, propaganda is 
seen as a process of communication between the propagandist acting as the source of 
information and the target audience acting as the destination which decodes the information. 
Propaganda itself is the message which is sent from the source to the destination through a 
special medium (such as radio, for example). The destination can only decode the message 
of the source if both are in tune, i.e. if both share some common experiences. The source, 
therefore, must try to encode the message in such a way as to make it easy for the 
destination to decode it. In order to give his message the greatest effect the propagandist 
must try to find out as much as possible about his target audience. Only then can he chose 
the right timing for the message, the right kind of language, and the attitudes and values 
which will appeal to his target audience. There are four basic requirements for the success of 
any communication. Firstly, the message must be so designed as to gain the attention of the 
recipient. Secondly, it must employ signs which refer to previous experiences of the 
audience. Thirdly, the message must arouse personal needs in the audience which lead it 
towards taking action; and finally, it must suggest a way to meet those needs. A message is 
always more likely to succeed if it fits the patterns of understandings, attitudes, values and 
goals of the receiver, or if at least it starts with this pattern and tries to reshape it slightly 
during the process. There remains, however, one factor of uncertainty: how will the target 
audience react? This is beyond the influence of the sender who can only shape the content of 
the message.6 
                                                                                                                                                      
4
 Ibid., p. 16. 
5
 Ibid., pp. 13-15; Fraser 1957, pp. 4-5. 
6
 Schramm 1972, pp. 20-2, 26-37. 
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Propaganda operates to a great extent on the basis of emotions, and all human 
emotions can serve as potential channels for influencing a target. The success of propaganda 
thus depends on the strength of emotions already existing in the minds of the target and on 
the psychological condition of the audience. But rational arguments are likewise important, 
since a logical presentation is also likely to succeed (although in a different way than to an 
emotional appeal).7 Propaganda has the greatest effect where it is in line with existing 
opinions or emotions of the receiver. Most propaganda messages are therefore more 
supportive of, than discrepant from, existing views, and they tend to reinforce rather than 
change established attitudes. If radical changes of behaviour occur they are generally not 
caused by propaganda alone, but in combination with other factors such as social conditions, 
group interaction and the like. Values and behaviour patterns that are deeply rooted in a 
society are not likely to be affected by propaganda.
8
 Propaganda may be extremely 
sophisticated but nevertheless unsuccessful. We have to remember that the process of 
propaganda is not a purely technical one, but that it involves the feelings and thoughts of 
human beings. The power of propaganda over opinion can therefore never be absolute.9 
There are many ways for the propagandist to manipulate the thinking and behaviour 
of his target audience. He will try to control the flow of information and to shape the 
opinion of his target through the use of certain strategies of informative communication. The 
flow of information can be controlled by withholding information, by releasing information 
at a predetermined time and/or in combination with other information, or by distorting 
information.10 Often the propagandist will try to conceal his true identity. Propaganda can 
therefore appear in different forms according to the forthrightness with which its source is 
                                                     
7
 Fraser 1957, pp.10-11, Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, pp. 66, 139; Hale 1975, p. xvi; Thomson 1975, pp. 
16-17. 
8
 Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, pp. 116-17. 
9
 Carr 1939, p. 27; Hale 1975, p. xvii. 
10
 Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, pp. 15, 34-7. 
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identified. ‘White’ propaganda is when the propagandist reveals his identity. In times of war 
official government propaganda would be of this type. The source of ‘grey’ propaganda 
cannot be identified correctly and it is left to the audience to decide who is behind it. 
‘Black’ propaganda gives a false source and purports to be something which it is not.11 
The propagandist’s message must be credible even if the information contained in it is 
distorted. Credibility and truth need not necessarily be the same, as will be shown in the 
case of British ‘black’ radio stations which seemed very credible to the German audience 
although their transmissions largely consisted of lies.12 
Propaganda is associated with the control of information, therefore the media which 
allow this control and provide a means of reaching the audience are an essential 
precondition for its success. Propaganda has changed its form during the centuries with the 
development of the media. As a rule it can work through all sorts of media such as the visual 
arts, music, the written and the spoken word, but the development of the mass media like 
newspapers, radio, cinema and television from the late nineteenth century onwards has 
greatly enhanced its sophistication and effectiveness. Each medium has contributed to the 
development of the techniques of propaganda, and in particular radio has opened the door to 
the feasibility of international propaganda.13  
The aim of this study is to offer a unified synthesis of British radio propaganda 
against Nazi Germany during the Second World War both in regard to the organisation of 
the British propaganda apparatus and to its output. There does of course exist a vast 
literature on British propaganda, but the authors of most of it are either ex-propagandists 
who write about their own work (e.g. Balfour, Delmer, Howe, Lerner, Fraser, Brinitzer), or 
                                                     
11
 Ibid., pp. 17-20, 36-7; Hundhausen 1975, p. 26. 
12
 Roetter 1974, pp. 13-24; Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 17-20, write that the information in the 
message of ‘white’ propaganda is accurate and that it aims at building credibility with the audience, 
whereas ‘black’ propaganda disseminates lies and misinformation. This definition, however, is too 
simple, for ‘white’ propaganda can also disseminate false information and ‘black’ propaganda 
often uses accurate information! 
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they deal only with small parts of British propaganda (Briggs and Mansell with the BBC, 
and Howe and Cruickshank with ‘black’ propaganda). These works have all the advantages 
and disadvantages of insider histories. They are based on a rich knowledge of the 
personalities and milieu of propaganda production, but are often focused on specific areas of 
propaganda activity. None of the writers devotes himself to a thorough examination of the 
organisational background and its implications for the propaganda output, or to a 
comparative analysis of both ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda output. Even Balfour in his 
monumental study of British and German propaganda reveals very little of the 
organisational background or the content of broadcasts. Pütter offers a valuable 
compendium on both ‘white’ and ‘black’ radio propaganda, but his statements about the 
work and aims of the radio stations are often quite general and imprecise regarding the 
location of sources. The present study cannot, of course, replace a thorough history of 
British radio propaganda against Germany during the Second World War - such a study is 
still waiting to be written - but it is intended to supplement more detailed studies with a 
synthetic account of the organisation, content and impact of British propaganda as a whole. 
Before British propaganda institutions and their ‘products’ are examined, we shall 
look briefly at the historical development of international radio propaganda between the two 
World Wars and at the evolution of attitudes which helped to determine the organisation of 
British political warfare during the wartime years. 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 16, 38, 50, 63, 154, 160-2. 
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Part One: 
International Propaganda before World War II 
1. British propaganda against Germany during the First World War and 
the discussion about the effectiveness of psychological warfare 
thereafter 
From ancient times military actions have been accompanied by verbal attacks like dia-
tribes or defamatory statements against the enemy. The aim has always been to weaken the 
enemy’s will to resist with a minimum deployment of their own fighting capacity. But it was 
for the first time during the First World War that sophisticated techniques of propaganda 
were utilised systematically, that enemy propaganda was organised on a large scale and that 
theories of psychological warfare were developed.14 
The prominent role which propaganda played during the First World War must be 
seen in close relation to the changed character of warfare. Whereas in earlier centuries war 
had been a conflict between professional armies, it developed more and more into a conflict 
between populations. The concept of ‘total war’ - a form of warfare in which all sections of 
a nation are engaged - originated in the French revolutionary wars, but it reached a new 
climax during the First World War. This meant that governments had to take more and more 
into consideration the psychological climate and public opinion of their own as well as of 
the enemy populations.15 Propaganda was increasingly regarded as a new weapon, or ‘the 
fifth arm’, of modern warfare, since it was a means for influencing the masses whose 
attitude was perceived as vital for the conduct of war.
16
 At home it was used to justify the 
need for war and personal sacrifices; the propaganda to enemy countries, however, should 
                                                     
14
 Fraser 1957, p. 32; Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, p. 119. 
15
 Roetter 1974, pp. viii, 68; Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, p. 97. 
16
 Taylor 1983, p. 26, defines the other arms of defence as army, navy, air force and blockade 
(economic weapon). See also Taylor 1981b, p. 30. 
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convince the soldiers and civilians that their sacrifices were unjust and unnecessary and 
should induce them to surrender or to revolt against the government.17 
During the First World War the British took the lead in propaganda activities because 
they were forced to think seriously about it earlier than any other country. Britain did not 
have universal conscription and had much more difficulty recruiting volunteers. For this 
reason German atrocity stories coming out of Belgium were circulated in Britain in order to 
raise public sympathies for going to war against Germany.18  
In 1914 Britain possessed nothing like an official propaganda department. The propa-
ganda campaigns were run by the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Admiralty as 
branches of other activities. From 1916 propaganda was conducted by the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence at the War Office. Since this decentralised situation did not make for 
efficiency it was decided in summer 1918 to establish a Department for Enemy Propaganda 
(Crewe House). It continued the propaganda activities on a more centralised, systematic and 
consistent basis.19 
British propaganda against Germany consisted of leaflets and pamphlets dropped 
from balloons or aeroplanes which contained news, facts and figures about the Allied war 
effort, reports about the situation on the fronts which were not published by the German 
press and statements of Allied war aims. During the first years of the war propaganda was 
directed exclusively to German front line troops, who were promised good treatment if they 
surrendered, but in 1918 attempts were also made to reach the civilian populations in 
Germany itself.20 
                                                     
17
 Taylor 1983, pp. 20-1, 23; Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, p. 97; Fraser 1957, p. 33. 
18
 Fraser 1957, pp. 33-4; Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 123-4. 
19
 Memorandum by Tallents, Information in Enemy Countries, 7/11/1938, PRO, FO 898/1, p. 2. 
Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 124-5; Fraser 1957, pp. 41-2; Taylor 1983, p. 21 
20
 Fraser 1957, pp. 41-2; Wittek 1962, p. 19; A.J.P. Taylor 1965, p. 107. 
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It is very doubtful whether British propaganda helped to bring about the defeat of 
Germany. Although it was skilfully carried out it did not cause any change in the course of 
military events. It was only when the military and economic situation deteriorated that the 
German population became receptive for British propaganda messages, which told them that 
their situation was hopeless.21 But even if British propaganda must be denied any success in 
defeating Germany, it had far-reaching consequences. Immediately after the end of the war a 
fierce controversy broke out about the question whether and how much British propaganda 
had contributed to Germany’s defeat. British propaganda was considered to have been very 
effective in destroying German war morale. This view originated in Germany itself and 
became part of the Dolchstoßlegende which was used by German politicians of the right 
after the war to stress that Germany had not been defeated in the battle field, but that the 
home front had collapsed inter alia under the influence of British propaganda.22 
After the First World War social scientists began to investigate the phenomenon of 
propaganda and public opinion. During the 1920s and 1930s countless books on propaganda 
appeared in Germany as well as in Britain and the United States. The tenor of these writings 
was that Britain had discovered an effective new weapon against which the best troops and 
military equipment were useless.23 They greatly enhanced the myth of the unlimited powers 
of propaganda. In 1927 Harold Lasswell wrote that propaganda was ‘one of the most 
powerful instrumentalities in the modern world’ which was able ‘to weld thousands and 
even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope.’24  
All in all this perception of propaganda was to have far-reaching consequences for the 
international climate during the interwar period and for the Second World War. 
                                                     
21 
Fraser 1957, pp. 47-9; Roetter 1974, pp. 80-81, 88; Carr 1939, pp. 11. 
22
 Fraser 1957, pp. 44-8; Roetter 1974, pp. 86-88; Seth 1969, pp. 15-17. 
23
 Roetter 1974, p. 87; Jowett/O’Donnell 1986, pp. 96, 99, 121-2. 
24
 Lasswell, Harold, Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York, 1927, cited in  
Jowett/O'Donnell 1986, p. 99. 
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2. International politics and the rise of radio propaganda during the inter-
war period 
After its allegedly successful use in the First World War, propaganda also conquered 
the fields of national and international politics. 
Prior to 1914, any systematic use of propaganda by governments was regarded as un-
dignified and disreputable.25 That this changed fundamentally after the First World War was 
due to the deterioration of international relations, the rise of totalitarian states, the develop-
ment of new means of communication and an increased popular interest in politics. 
The political climate in Europe between the two World Wars was more that of a ‘civil 
war between the forces of oligarchy, aristocracy, authoritarianism, Fascism and those of 
popular democracy, socialism, revolution’ than that of diplomatic relations.26 The outbreak 
of the First World War saw the breakdown of the European states system with its political 
conventions which had prevailed for many decades. The League of Nations, founded in 
1919 to maintain peace and order, was no substitute for the self-imposed diplomatic rules of 
the concert of nations in the pre-war period. In order to achieve its aims it depended on the 
good will and consensus of all member states, which was lost with the rise of the totalitarian 
states and their anarchic attitudes towards international politics in the 1930s. So the 
international peace system laid down by the League of Nations ceased to be effective.27 
During the 1930s Hitler and Mussolini made massive use of propaganda for 
influencing both the home audiences and populations abroad. For the first time they 
employed the new mass medium radio extensively to achieve their political ends.28 The 
behaviour of the totalitarian states caused great concern in the democratic world, and the 
need to counter the propagandistic attacks was felt more and more urgently. 
                                                     
25
 Carr 1939, p. 9-10. 
26
 Watt 1975, p. 13. 
27
 Ibid., pp. 13-18; Taylor 1983, pp. 36-38. 
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An important factor for the increased use of propaganda, even by democratic govern-
ments, was the growing number of people whose opinion was politically significant. Politi-
cians became increasingly dependent on the opinion of large masses of more or less 
politically conscious people and had to find new means of influencing them to their favour.29 
Public interest in foreign affairs was largely due to the experiences of the First World War 
and to the development of new weapons of mass destruction in the 1930s (whose effects 
were demonstrated in the Spanish civil war), which made the public more sensitive to 
changes on the international scene. Another factor was the higher level of education which 
increased the politicisation of the masses.30 Social disruption caused by unemployment, 
inflation and the fear of another war made people sensitive to international politics and 
created an ideal climate for radical political propaganda to flourish.31 
A central role in the rise of international propaganda was played by the new mass me-
dium radio which revolutionised the potential for influencing large audiences at home and 
abroad. Several features make radio an effective instrument of national and international 
propaganda: it can address many people at the same time regardless of their place of resi-
dence, literacy, political and ideological affiliations or their social status. Radio is not 
limited geographically, it can cross borders without control and it is difficult to stop 
(although this is, to some extent, technically possible by ‘jamming’). Another psychological 
advantage of radio is that it works on the basis of the spoken word. This makes it direct and 
personal in approach and appealing to the emotions of the audience. The ability of radio to 
transcendent political and geographical boundaries gave international propaganda a new 
                                                                                                                                                      
28
 Thomson 1977, pp. 111-19. 
29
 Carr 1939, pp. 3-5. 
30
 Taylor 1994, p. 325. 
31
 Taylor 1983, pp. 19-20. 
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significance because it enabled governments to project their own cause to foreign audiences 
directly.32 
The interest in radio grew rapidly during the 1920s, and the technical improvements 
of radio led to its extensive use in international disputes.33 The 1930s then saw an explosion 
in the use of international radio. Hitler and Mussolini were deeply convinced of its value as 
a means of propaganda and soon began to establish foreign-language programmes.34  
On the whole, the alleged power of propaganda, its seemingly unlimited destructive 
success in defeating Germany during the First World War, and the rise of the first truly mass 
media such as radio suggested that propaganda was likely to prove of great importance in 
the waging of any future war. Although this assumption tended to be exaggerated by 
contemporaries, the peacetime exploitation of propaganda by the totalitarian regimes served 
to reinforce it.35 
 
                                                     
32 
Ibid., pp. 29-31; Short 1983, p. 3; Taylor 1994, p. 325; Hale 1975, pp. x-xiii; Jowett/O’Donnell 
1986, p. 82. 
33
 Such disputes were: in 1923 the German radio campaign against the French invasion of the Ruhr; in 
1926 the Russian radio offensive against Romania during the dispute over Bessarabia; in 1936 the 
Nazi radio campaign during the Saar Plebiscite. Bumpus/Skelt 1984, pp. 10-12; Jowett/O'Donnell 
1986, p. 140; Browne 1982, pp. 48-50. 
34
 Bumpus/Skelt 1984, pp. 17-21; Fraser 1957, pp. 73-4; Browne 1982, pp. 1-2. 
35
 Taylor 1981a, pp. 261, 263. 
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3. The British Government and international propaganda, 1919-1939 
3.1. British reluctance to use international propaganda 
Whereas political propaganda mushroomed in the totalitarian states during the 
interwar period Britain abstained largely from this development. The wartime machinery for 
propaganda (Crewe House and the Ministry of Information) was dissolved immediately after 
the end of the war in the course of demobilisation and on the assumption of a lasting peace. 
Although propaganda was recognised as having been successful in defeating Germany, the 
British Government and a large section of the public regarded it as suspect, politically dan-
gerous, financially unjustifiable and therefore unacceptable in peacetime. The British 
rejected the idea of deliberate perversion of truth as a policy to be adopted by the 
government in the pursuit of national ends. The use of propaganda was regarded as contrary 
to the traditional rules of international relations in existence before 1914.36 
However, the Foreign Office decided in 1919 to retain its News Department as an 
agency for conducting publicity abroad and for issuing information about overseas events to 
the British and the foreign press. It had been recognised in Whitehall that ‘the era when it 
was possible either to lead opinion in foreign politics by mere authority or tradition, or to 
ignore it from Olympian heights, has long since vanished [...]. It has become, and must be, 
practically a never ceasing intercourse with the publicity world.’37 
The rise of totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany and their extensive use of 
international propaganda undermined British ideals of peace and forced the nation to 
organise some sort of defence against their attacks. It slowly became clear that another war 
might be possible and that propaganda would play an even greater role in the next, than in 
                                                     
36
 Ibid., p. 261; Carr 1939, p. 12; Mansell 1982, p. 55; Cruickshank 1977, p. 9; Taylor 1983, pp. 24-5. 
37
 Memorandum by J.D. Gregory, Reconstruction of Press and News Department, 21/2/1925,  PRO, 
FO 366/783, cited in Taylor 1994, p. 324. 
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the previous war.38 Britain was nonetheless slow to respond to the threat which totalitarian 
propaganda activities posed for the democracies. The foundation of the British Council in 
1934 was Britain’s first institutional response to the increasing importance of propaganda as 
a factor in peace-time international politics. This strictly cultural body, with the task to sell 
British culture and the British way of life, remained for several years the only form of 
external propaganda tolerated by British authorities and public opinion.39 But it became 
more and more recognised that Britain could not abstain from a more open use of 
propaganda to defend its political interests. In 1937 Chamberlain stated: ‘His Majesty’s 
Government fully realise that [...] the old stand-upon-your-own-dignity methods are no 
longer applicable to modern conditions and that, in the rough-and-tumble of international 
relations which we see today, it is absolutely necessary that we should take measures to 
protect ourselves from constant misrepresentation.’40 
Anti-British Italian broadcasts were the cause of Britain’s engagement in international 
radio propaganda. Italian broadcasts to the Middle East, which started around 1934, were at 
first intended to increase Italian influence in this area, but when Italy invaded Abyssinia in 
September 1935 their tone became violently anti-British, and in Britain the call for counter-
measures became louder. At the same time the Foreign Office was also concerned about 
German and Italian propaganda directed to Latin America and considered introducing 
foreign-language programmes to these countries. Rex Leeper, head of the Foreign Office 
News Department, urged for greater official commitment to the conduct of propaganda 
abroad in order to strengthen British influence in those areas which were vulnerable to 
German and Italian political and economic penetration.41  
                                                     
38 
Short 1983, pp. 2-3; Taylor 1983, pp. 24-5; Taylor 1981a, p. 261; Carr 1939, p. 21. 
39
 Taylor 1981a, pp. 181, 212; Cruickshank 1977, p. 9; Fraser 1957, p. 87. 
40
 Hansard, 5th series, vol. 330, 21/12/1937, col. 1803, cited in Taylor 1981a, p. 204. 
41
 Bumpus/Skelt 1984, pp. 25-7; Taylor 1981a, pp. 182, 191; Balfour 1979, pp. 88-9. 
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Sir John Reith, Director-General of the BBC, had long been aware of the potential 
value of overseas broadcasting, but the BBC was unable to start its Empire Service until 
1932. Although the original idea of the Empire Service was to link the Empire with the 
mother country by means of radio, Reith tried to make it a means for the dissemination of 
British views and values not just within the Empire but to a wider public, since the Empire 
Service could be received all over the world. The alarming growth of German and Italian 
external broadcasting led Reith to urge for the widening of British programmes and for the 
introduction of foreign-language broadcasts to make the voice of Britain heard effectively 
throughout the world.42  
The report of the Ullswater Committee, an independent official review body set up in 
1935 to investigate British broadcasting, stated that ‘in the interests of British prestige and 
influence in world affairs, we think that the appropriate use of languages other than English 
should be encouraged’.43 But the BBC took no immediate steps to implement this 
recommendation. Although Reith and other influential people advocated taking over 
foreign-language broadcasting on behalf of the government there were still too many critics 
inside the BBC, who thought it inappropriate and damaging for the reputation of the 
corporation to engage in propaganda activities. The BBC finally agreed to start a foreign-
language programme, but it was decided that it must be kept separate from the Empire 
Service.44 The new service would be financed largely by the government, which also 
retained the right to refuse material desired by the BBC. The BBC, on the other hand, would 
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be responsible for the programmes and remain independent from government interference, 
but seek Foreign Office guidance on all complex issues.45  
Broadcasting in Arabic to the Middle East began on 3 January 1938, and it was fol-
lowed in March 1938 by broadcasts in Spanish and Portuguese directed to Latin America. 
The main aim of the new services was the dissemination of news, not of propaganda in the 
way that it was understood by the totalitarian states. The BBC was far from trying to win 
over people in foreign countries to the British way of thinking.46 
 
3.2. The Munich crisis and the beginnings of British German-language radio 
propaganda 
The rejection by the British of the use of propaganda against the totalitarian states 
was caused partly by the government’s policy of appeasement. The Abyssinian crisis, 
Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland and, above all, the Munich crisis shattered 
Britain’s post-war dream of security and peace. Chamberlain, who was a strong opponent to 
rearmament, thought that Mussolini and Hitler must be treated like statesmen and could be 
appeased by rational discussion. He believed that appeasement would be the best way to 
bring Germany back to civilised behaviour.47 For the British, propaganda meant war. The 
reluctance of the government to answer totalitarian propaganda reflected the reluctance of 
the whole nation to go to another war for which it was not yet prepared. But the illusion of 
peace was shattered by the events of September 1938.48 
During the Munich crisis the British government finally realised the urgent need for 
propaganda against Germany. As the crisis threatened to develop into war, the government 
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charged the BBC on 27 September with broadcasting a German translation of Chamberlain’s 
speech on the crisis. Although Chamberlain could appease Hitler once more, the Foreign Of-
fice asked the BBC to continue the German broadcasts as a permanent commitment to 
explain the British point of view during a time of political crisis.49 
Until the outbreak of war, the BBC’s German broadcasts were supervised by the 
Foreign Office. Control was at first close, but from November 1938 onwards the BBC was 
left to get on with it. The BBC prepared the broadcasts in daily consultation with the 
Foreign Office, but the editorial policy of the BBC remained nonetheless firmly committed 
to the principle of truth. Although the beginnings of the German Service were very 
improvised, the new service flourished rapidly. After negotiations with the Foreign Office in 
December 1938 the BBC extended the German broadcasts from ten to fifteen minutes, and 
by the end of January 1939 they were lengthened to a half-hour programme including 
Sonderberichte (commentaries). After the German invasion of Prague in March 1939 the 
daily broadcasts to Germany were increased to 45 minutes, and after the outbreak of war to 
one hour.50 
On the whole, Britain’s entry into the field of international propaganda during the 
1930s was somewhat tardy, but once the need for countering totalitarian propaganda had 
been recognised by the government in 1937/38, active steps were taken to set up an 
apparatus for conducting propaganda against potential enemy nations. In the beginning, this 
was rather improvised, and in fact it took more than two years until the final shape for the 
British propaganda department had been worked out. 
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Part Two: 
The War-time Organisation of British Radio Propaganda 
1. The organisation of enemy propaganda until August 1941 
1.1. The Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries under Campbell 
Stuart, summer of 1938 - summer of 1940 
Although the British government hesitated several years before they began to openly 
conduct foreign propaganda in 1938 with the establishment of the BBC’s foreign-language 
services, the need for a propaganda department in the event of another war had been realised 
as early as 1935. In this year, which saw the beginnings of the Abyssinian crisis, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) charged a special sub-committee with drafting plans 
for a wartime Ministry of Information (MoI) in complete secrecy. It was felt in government 
circles that propaganda would play a vital role in the next war both at home and abroad. One 
lesson drawn from the experiences of the First World War was that inter-departmental 
rivalries and overlapping of competencies had to be avoided in any future conflict and that it 
would be desirable to centralise the conduct of all propaganda (both on the home front and 
against the enemy) under a sole roof.51 
Yet planning was largely concentrated on home propaganda, and little attention was 
paid to the question of propaganda to enemy countries until 1938. This changed when Hitler 
annexed Austria in March 1938. Preparations for a wartime propaganda department became 
more urgent, for the government now realised how little prepared it was to conduct enemy 
propaganda. It was felt that a specialist department for the conduct of propaganda to the 
enemy outside the MoI but responsible to the Minister of Information would be needed. 
Until this point all preparations for wartime propaganda had been based on the concept of 
‘white’ propaganda, i.e. accurate news and information disseminated by official government 
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agencies, but in the wake of the Anschluß the British also began to think about clandestine 
warfare and methods of subversion.52 
In the spring of 1938 two organisations were thus founded for the conduct of enemy 
propaganda. The first of these was Section D, an operational branch of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS), whose purpose was to handle espionage, subversion and sabotage 
against the enemy.53 The other organisation was the Department of Propaganda in Enemy 
Countries, called Department EH after the initials of its headquarters at the Imperial 
Communications Committee in Electra House on the Victoria Embankment. Sir Campbell 
Stuart, chairman of this committee, was invited by Chamberlain to consider and report 
informally on the steps necessary for the creation of a new department for enemy 
propaganda. He had been Secretary to Northcliffe at Crewe House in 1918. Stuart began to 
work on plans for Department EH in complete secrecy, but at the time of the Munich crisis 
only a vague plan existed on paper.54 
The Munich crisis provided a valuable dress rehearsal for the British propaganda 
institutions in that it revealed the hopeless inadequacy of the preparations for the MoI. The 
shadow MoI was partly mobilised on 26 September 1938 amidst chaos and confusion. Sir 
Stephen Tallents, the General-Director Designate of the MoI, wrote after the crisis: ‘The 
outstanding lesson, however, taught by the September rehearsal in the Ministry’s sphere, 
was the lack of machinery for securing the prompt, wide and efficient conveyance of British 
news and views to potential enemy countries.’55  
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But the planners of the MoI had also done some valuable work. In spring and summer 
of 1938 they had worked on an analysis of German public opinion and the most effective 
methods which should be employed in the case of an emergency. They had found out that 
German public opinion was starved of uncensored news by the Nazi regime and would 
prove susceptible to propaganda with facts. This was partly the motivating factor behind the 
BBC’s decision to broadcast a German translation of Chamberlain’s speech on 27 
September.56 
During the Munich crisis the Cabinet asked Stuart to organise the secret department. 
Stuart now began to collect together a small nucleus of staff for each potential enemy 
country. But his preparations came too late to prove effective. When the immediate danger 
of war was over, preparations for the mobilisation of the department were interrupted. 
However, Stuart was appointed chairman of a new sub-committee of the CID to consider 
possible methods to conduct propaganda to the enemy.57 When Hitler invaded Prague in 
March 1939 and it became clear that Germany was determined to go to war, Stuart was 
asked to resume preparations for Department EH. It was arranged to move most of the staff 
from Electra House to Woburn Abbey, the seat of the Duke of Bedford, on the outbreak of 
war, for it was feared that London would be bombed immediately.58 
It was in the aftermath of the Munich crisis that the inter-departmental struggle for the 
control of propaganda developed which was to prevail until the autumn of 1941 and which 
was the source of much of the inefficiencies of the British propaganda effort during the first 
years of the war. Although the sub-committee charged with the planning of the MoI had 
stated in 1936 that the MoI was to assume responsibility for all propaganda at home and 
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abroad at the outbreak of war, the foundation of Department EH and Section D had 
undermined this decision. Now there were three bodies for the conduct of propaganda: the 
MoI for ‘white’ government propaganda, Department EH for enemy propaganda, and 
Section D for subversive activities. Rex Leeper was keen not to lose control of the official 
foreign propaganda to the MoI and demanded that until the outbreak of war the organisation 
of foreign propaganda remained under Foreign Office control. The initiative to charge Stuart 
with the preparation of Department EH had come from the Foreign Office and was intended 
to prevent Tallents from gaining control over foreign propaganda. The Foreign Office even 
insisted on the revival of its Political Intelligence Department (PID) for the collection of 
information about foreign countries for use by the propagandists and the government. 
Finally, it was agreed in January 1939 that on the outbreak of war Department EH would 
take over responsibility for enemy propaganda from the Foreign Office.59  
On 3 September Department EH became responsible to the Minister of Information 
(Lord MacMillan), but it remained distinct from the rest of the MoI. It was a secret depart-
ment and financed from the secret vote. The main reason for this was the belief that propa-
ganda could not be effectively conducted if its officials were continuously forced to justify 
their actions in public. During the first year of its existence Department EH changed its af-
filiation between the MoI and the Foreign Office several times. In October 1939 its control 
was transferred from the Ministry of Information to the Foreign Office. At the beginning of 
June 1940, before Stuart went to Canada, control went partly back to the Minister of Infor-
mation (since May 1940 Duff Cooper).60 
The staff of Department EH received mobilisation instructions on 19 August, even be-
fore the news of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact was published. Mobilisation was ordered on 1 
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September and Department EH was evacuated to the Riding School building at Woburn 
Abbey in Bedfordshire, as had been agreed earlier in the year. It became known from then as 
‘Country Headquarters’ (CHQ) or ‘The Country’, and its location was kept a military secret. 
The staff were housed in Woburn or in the surrounding villages and given strict instructions 
on security.61 
For ten months, from September 1939 until June 1940, Department EH had primary 
responsibility for propaganda against the enemy. Propaganda policy was discussed at the 
Planning Committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director. The department had an 
expert intelligence department at its disposal which studied the German press and the output 
of the BBC Monitoring Service. Yet it was more or less a reincarnation of Crewe House. 
Campbell Stuart, who was head of Department EH, orientated his propaganda policy largely 
on the principles of the 1918 campaigns. The role of radio was examined, but its potential 
was not yet fully appreciated. Much emphasis was put on leaflet propaganda. The work of 
the staff consisted mainly of preparing leaflets to be dropped over Germany and of issuing 
policy directives for the BBC’s German Service, which were in any case never welcomed.62 
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1.2. The organisation of enemy propaganda by SO1, July 1940 - August 1941 
Neither the organisation, nor the work of Department EH proved a great success and 
it therefore disappeared with the Chamberlain government. After Churchill had become 
Prime Minister in May 1940, a drastic reorganisation of the propaganda department took 
place. In June 1940 Sir Campbell Stuart left for Canada on urgent business on behalf of the 
Imperial Communications Advisory Board. While he was abroad, Department EH was 
dissolved and its propaganda functions were transferred to a new body. When Churchill 
formed his coalition government, he appointed Dr. Hugh Dalton (Labour) Minister of 
Economic Warfare and invited him, on 16 July, to take charge of a new and secret 
organisation with responsibility to co-ordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage 
against the enemy. Dalton set up this Special Operations Executive (SOE) with two 
branches: SO1 took over the propaganda functions of Department EH, SO2 the sabotage 
functions of Section D. The responsibility for the BBC’s ‘white’ propaganda was left with 
the Ministry of Information. Rex Leeper became head of SO1. He formally worked for 
Dalton, but it was the Foreign Office which retained the last word on propaganda policy.63 
This arrangement lasted until the autumn of 1941 and gave rise to a sort of civil war 
between Foreign Office, Ministry of Information and Ministry of Economic Warfare 
(MEW).64 The fierce rivalry between the various ministries was caused by the question of 
whether ‘white’ propaganda should belong to the MoI (because it was official government 
propaganda) or to the MEW (since all measures aimed at undermining enemy morale were 
the responsibility of SO1, and the BBC’s German broadcasts pursued the same goal). Dalton 
advocated putting all propaganda to enemy countries under the control of one department. 
He argued that both ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda were a single subject because they had 
the same aim: the subversion of enemy morale. For that reason they had to be closely co-
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ordinated. Others argued that this would damage the BBC’s reputation for credibility and 
make it impossible for Dalton to justify his policies for ‘white’ propaganda in Parliament, 
since SOE was a secret organisation. Duff Cooper, a powerful politician, was most strongly 
opposed to Dalton’s plans to take over overt propaganda. Finally, a compromise was 
reached and it was agreed to leave the BBC under the Minister of Information. But since the 
MoI had no German staff to handle the work, it was arranged for SO1 staff to work for the 
MoI on a part-time basis.65 
Dalton was not satisfied at all with the separation of competencies: ‘I have been told 
to arrange subversion against the enemy. In this task one of my most powerful instruments 
of propaganda is the BBC broadcasts. These, however, are not at my disposal, but remain in 
the control of another Ministry.’66 It was therefore not surprising that this arrangement did 
not work and that the rivalries between Duff Cooper and Dalton went on. Dalton tried to 
gain control over the BBC, whereas Duff Cooper demanded that control over SO1’s 
operations be returned to him.67 
Churchill, who was not himself interested in propaganda and wanted to end the 
quarrel, ordered Lord President Sir John Anderson to settle the differences between the two 
warring ministers. Since both overt and covert propaganda should have a common policy, 
but neither the Minister of Information nor the Minister of Economic Warfare could control 
both of them, Anderson met on 16 May 1941 with the two ministers and with the Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, to work out a solution. Anderson proposed to set up a 
‘triumvirate’, consisting of Duff Cooper, Dalton and Eden. Dalton was made responsible for 
covert, Duff Cooper for overt propaganda. Together with Eden, who would decide on the 
foreign policy aspects of propaganda, they would form a Joint Ministerial Committee. Each 
                                                                                                                                                      
64
 Briggs 1995, pp. 32-3, Cruickshank 1977, p. 30. 
65
 Balfour 1979, p. 91; Cruickshank 1977, pp. 17-18. 
66
 PRO, INF 1/893, 15/12/1940, cited in Cruickshank 1977, p. 19. 
 30 
of the three ministers would appoint a senior official to provide co-operation at the 
operational level.68 
Duff Cooper disliked the ‘Anderson Award’ as this arrangement was called, from the 
beginning. It had not settled the dispute over the control of external propaganda and its 
result was to perpetuate much of the inefficiency and frustration, from which British 
propaganda had suffered since the outbreak of war. Things only became better when Duff 
Cooper left in July 1941 and was replaced as Minister of Information by Brendan Bracken, 
who was a protégé of Churchill. By the end of July Robert Bruce Lockhart, the Foreign 
Office representative on the committee of officials, and his two colleagues Rex Leeper and 
Brigadier Dallas Brooks produced proposals for a new structure of the enemy propaganda 
department.69 
This paper proposes the creation of a Department for Political Warfare: that 
is, the placing of a number of different bodies, at present carrying out separate 
activities in political warfare, under the control of one Executive Committee 
who can jointly direct and control them. [...] 
What is lacking in this set-up is day-to-day executive control of the different 
activities under one hand. This can only be supplied by the creation of a general 
staff for political warfare, controlling the bodies concerned and responsible to 
the Ministerial Committee on matters of major policy.70 
The report proposed the formation of an Executive Committee which should be sup-
plied with offices and a secretariat independent of any Ministry. It would be responsible to 
the Ministerial Committee and be charged with issuing policy guidelines for any government 
body concerned with political warfare, the most important being SO1 and the BBC’s 
European services.71 
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After two years of ministerial quarrelling the British government had finally found a 
solution for the establishment of a department with sole responsibility for enemy 
propaganda. The inter-departmental rivalries had absorbed much energy and made it very 
difficult for the staff of the propaganda department to get on with their day-to-day work.72  
 
1.3. The formation of the BBC’s German Service and its relations with Depart-
ment EH and SO1 
During the first two years of the war the BBC’s German Service was the main agency 
for conducting radio propaganda against Germany. Nevertheless, making propaganda was a 
very difficult task not only because of the constant military defeats of Britain, but owing to 
two organisational defects. The first was that the German Service did not exist at the 
outbreak of war and still had to be established in its basic structure. The other was the 
relations between the BBC and Department EH and SO1 which had not been defined before 
the outbreak of war and were an organisational disaster. 
At the outbreak of war the German Service did not exist as a separate unit. It 
consisted of a few German announcers, translators and British editors and commentators 
who were preparing news and talks in shifts in the ‘German Room’ at Broadcasting House. 
The German staff operated under the eye of language supervisors and switch-censors who 
were themselves under the control of Duckworth Barker, the Foreign Language Supervisor. 
The responsibility for the first news bulletins had been with the Director of the Empire 
Service, J.B. Clark. The broadcast output consisted largely of news bulletins and from early 
1939 onwards also of news talks. Organisational difficulties between news and news talks 
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on the one hand and the rest of the programme output only appeared with the increase in 
programme variety.73  
In November 1940 the first regular feature Vormarsch der Freiheit was introduced at 
the suggestion of SO1, and a German Features Unit at Bedford College was founded and put 
under the direction of the German émigré film star Walter Rilla. It was separated from the 
rest of the service not only by geography but also by administration, for it came under the 
control of the European Service Director J.S.A. Salt and had no contact with either News or 
News Talks.74 This proved a severe handicap for the efficiency and quality of the output of 
the German Service, for no unified control was established until late 1941. 
The European Service as a sub-division of the Overseas Service was created in the 
summer of 1940, but the organisational structure was not changed. It was divided into 
several independent language divisions (one of them being the German Service). News and 
programme directives were distributed centrally by the Central News Desk under Noel 
Newsome, the European News Editor, to the News Editors, who were in charge of a 
language service (Hugh Carleton Greene became German Editor). The staff dealing with 
features were under the direction of the European Productions Manager, Gibson Parker, who 
himself was a sub-ordinate of J.S.A. Salt. Talks and features staff could therefore produce 
anything they wanted without regard to the policy or output of the News Editors, for co-
ordination between the news and the features departments was non-existent.75 
Although J.S.A. Salt as Director of European Broadcasts had overall responsibility for 
planning, intelligence, scheduling, programme operations and presentation as well as control 
over foreign announcers and programme staffs, he did not control the most important part of 
the output, namely news and commentaries, which counted for over 80 per cent of the 
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output. News talks were the responsibility of Leonard Miall and later of Alan Bullock as 
European News Talks Editor working to Newsome. The geographical separation made the 
co-ordination problem even worse. The German news and news talks staff moved to Maida 
Vale in December 1940 after a German bomb had hit Broadcasting House (and in March 
1941 they moved into Bush House, which became the permanent seat of the European 
Service), whereas the German Features Department under Walter Rilla remained at Bedford 
College in Regents Park.76 
It had been proposed during the Munich crisis to bring as many famous German exile 
intellectuals and writers before the microphone as possible, who should ‘explain quite 
simply and without hatred why they no longer live in Germany.’77 The choice of material 
should be left largely to the emigrants themselves. These plans, however, were given up at 
the outbreak of war when it was decided that German staff could not appear at the 
microphone except for reading news. Political commentaries were written and broadcast 
exclusively by British staff such as Lindley Fraser, Richard Crossman, Patrick Gordon 
Walker and Charles Richardson (pseudonym of Marius Goring). The purpose behind this 
decision was to protect the BBC against charges that it was a mere emigrant station run by 
Jews and to convince German listeners that the views they heard were the expression of the 
opinion of the British government. Although the role of the emigrants was restricted to that 
of a speaker or translator, some were also working as writers and speakers of satirical 
features. But in such a case their true identity was never revealed. The only exception was 
made with Thomas Mann, who broadcast from 1940 to 1945 his monthly appeals to the 
German people under his own name.78 
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Although Sir John Reith had raised the issue of the position of the BBC in wartime as 
early as in 1934, relations between the BBC and the government had not been settled before 
the outbreak of war. When the first news were broadcast during and after the Munich crisis, 
a system of informal liaisons on policy matters developed between the BBC and the relevant 
Foreign Office desks. On 3 September 1939 Department EH took over from the Foreign Of-
fice the guidance of BBC broadcasts to enemy countries, but few inside the BBC knew of its 
existence. The staff were told that from now on they were dealing no longer with the 
Foreign Office desk but would receive their directives from this secret body. The BBC 
German Service did not even deal directly with Department EH, but its instructions were 
relayed by A.P. Ryan, who had been appointed BBC Liaison Officer with Department EH. 
He was a on the staff of the BBC and considered his duty to prevent it from having any 
effect on BBC output. ‘Recommendations’ were the only form of orders accepted by the 
BBC. A major problem was that many suggestions by Department EH were very amateurish 
because of a lack of experience, and the BBC had therefore every reason to reject them.79 
Relations between the BBC and the government were therefore tense. The German 
Service was often criticised for the way it disseminated news unfavourable for Britain, so 
that the MoI even suggested in 1940 that the government should take over the BBC. After 
lengthy discussions a committee under Sir Kingsley Wood was set up to examine the case. It 
proposed that the government appoint Ivone Kirkpatrick Foreign Adviser to the BBC. He 
would be on the staff of the MoI, and his task would be to make the directives of 
Department EH known to the European News Editor and to ensure that it was carried out. 
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The European News Editor was in turn responsible to him for the work of the Regional 
Editors.80 
The BBC was not pleased about the appointment of Kirkpatrick in February 1941, for 
it feared that he would lead to interference in its normal editorial processes and channels of 
control. But the BBC was given the right to appeal to the Minister of Information against 
advice it disagreed with. After Bracken had become Minister of Information in July 1941 the 
Foreign Adviser was also given a rank in the BBC, for Bracken recognised that it was 
unsatisfactory for the BBC that the official Advisers were not on its staff.81 
Between 1939 and 1941 the BBC was thus in a weak position in its dealings with De-
partment EH because of the lack of a senior BBC editor in charge of all German output. But 
despite this deficiency the propaganda department was never able to get complete hold of 
the BBC. One reason for this was geographical: Department EH’s location in Woburn did 
not help to impose its will on the German Service in London.82 The other reason was the 
determination of the BBC to resist as far as possible all instructions from the propaganda 
department. The disastrous relations between Department EH/SO1 and the BBC were inter 
alia one reason for the decision of Department EH that alternative radio stations be 
established for the conveyance of propaganda to Germany. 
 
1.4. The beginnings of ‘black’ broadcasting, May 1940 - May 1941 
Hardly any documentary evidence is available to reveal the motives behind the 
decision of Department EH in 1940 to establish ‘freedom stations’, as the first clandestine 
radio stations were called. It coincided with Germany’s occupation of Western Europe, 
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when the mood in Britain was rather desperate. It seems therefore reasonable to suppose that 
Department EH introduced the ‘freedom stations’ more by a sense of despair than by the 
hope that they would do any good, for the RAF had not dropped any leaflets since late April 
1940 and relations with the BBC were disastrous. Department EH may have found it 
convenient to develop an independent apparatus for conveying propaganda to Germany 
which had no connection with either the RAF or the BBC.83 
The first ‘black’ station, Hier spricht Deutschland, was set up in May 1940 under the 
guidance of F.A. Voigt, a British right-wing journalist working for Department EH. It was 
directed towards the conservative and patriotic Germans, but it does not seem to have 
reached a large audience because of its unrealistic political programme, and it was therefore 
given up in the spring of 1941.84 The second ‘black’ station, founded in October 1940 and 
aimed at German workers, was the Sender der Europäischen Revolution. It was run by 
German socialists and had been set up on the initiative of Richard Crossman, a left-wing 
Labour politician who had been made head of the German department at Woburn by Dalton 
after the foundation of SO1.85 
The aim of these stations was not so much to weaken the enemy’s morale - as was the 
objective of the later stations - but to convince their audiences of the rightness of their 
respective political programmes and to encourage resistance movements by means of 
appealing to the reason of their listeners and by explaining to them the dangers of National 
Socialism.86 The emigrants working for the early ‘black’ stations enjoyed a relative freedom 
in making their programmes. This changed, however, after the foundation of PWE in August 
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1941, for from then on the propaganda department issued daily directives which laid down 
in detail for both ‘white’ and ‘black’ stations the propaganda themes to be adopted.87 
Whereas Department EH had paid little attention to the idea of clandestine broad-
casting, Dalton was very interested in adding it to the activities of his newly founded SOE. 
The secret broadcasting stations expanded rapidly during 1940/41.88 But the establishment 
of the first two radio stations did not only serve psychological warfare purposes but was also 
the result of political fights between Crossman and Voigt within the British propaganda 
department.89  
Crossman had many opponents who criticised his left-wing Sender der Europäischen 
Revolution. Leonard Ingrams from the MEW was able to persuade Leeper in the spring of 
1941 that what was required for the Germans was something more than the political 
idealism of Crossman’s ‘revolutionary socialists’, who addressed their remarks to a vague 
audience of ‘good Germans’. What was needed was a new right-wing station (to counter 
Crossman’s socialists), whose aim would no longer be to convince its audience of any 
political programme or to address critics of the regime, but to spread dissatisfaction and to 
subvert the morale of the enemy.90  
The man chosen for this task was Sefton Delmer, a Daily Express journalist who had 
been ‘star speaker’ on the BBC’s German Service for some time. He arrived at Woburn in 
May 1941 and immediately began with preparations for Gustav Siegfried Eins, as the station 
was called. It was based on a completely new concept of ‘black’ radio propaganda which 
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was to open a new chapter in the history of psychological warfare.91 Although Delmer 
should have been technically a sub-ordinate of Crossman, it was decided at his arrival that 
Mr Crossman and Mr Delmer should in future be jointly in charge of the 
German Department, which should remain a unity, serving both the BBC and 
SO1; so that Mr Delmer should be responsible to the Director [Leeper] for all 
the S(pecial) O(perations) work carried out by the Department, while Mr 
Crossman should be responsible to the Ministry of Information for the BBC 
work [...].92 
Delmer and Crossman were now co-equal chiefs of the German section, but this re-
mained unknown to most people outside a very small circle. The new arrangement, however, 
relieved Delmer of the necessity of having to report to Crossman, which certainly was a 
wise decision in regard to their opposing political views and their strong characters. 
The year 1941 was therefore not only significant in that the government finally found 
a solution for the organisation of the British propaganda apparatus, but also in that it saw the 
emergence of a new concept of psychological warfare in the form of Delmer’s station 
Gustav Siegfried Eins. Since at the same time Hitler attacked Russia and consequently 
opened a new phase of war (which finally lead to Germany’s destruction), Britain was much 
better armed for the ‘war of words’ which was playing an increasingly important role. 
 
2. The formation and structure of the Political Warfare Executive, August 
1941 - May 1945 
The ‘Anderson Award’ of 16 May 1941 had not solved the problem of the control of 
enemy propaganda, but it cleared at last the way for the establishment of a more durable and 
efficient propaganda organisation. On 8 August Eden, Bracken and Dalton produced a paper 
on the new organisation, which was given the title Political Warfare Executive (PWE). Its 
purpose was to provide unified control of propaganda by regional direction through all 
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media, to eliminate competition and overlapping, to co-ordinate news with propaganda, and 
to co-ordinate propaganda policy with other departments.93 
The Ministers laid down in this paper that they would act as a Standing Ministerial 
Committee to deal with major questions of propaganda policy. The day-to-day work would 
be entrusted to a Executive Committee consisting of Bruce Lockhart, Rex Leeper and Major 
General Dallas Brooks. It was to act as a General Staff for the conduct of political warfare 
and its function was ‘to co-ordinate and direct, in accordance with the policy of H.M.G., as 
laid down by the Foreign Secretary, all propaganda to Enemy and Enemy-Occupied Territo-
ries’.94 The Executive Committee would conduct political warfare through an organisation 
formed by an amalgamation of the Foreign Publicity Division of the MoI, of the relevant 
sections of the BBC, and of SO1. It was charged with working out proposals for the merger 
of these institutions.95  
On 11 September 1941 Churchill announced the foundation of a special executive for 
the conduct of political warfare, but its composition and the nature of its activities were kept 
a secret. PWE was a secret department and communicated with the outside world on the 
notepaper of the PID, which was a non-secret section of the Foreign Office located at 2 Fitz-
maurice Place, Berqueley Square, W.1 (this became the seat of the Secretariat of PWE and 
of its Military Liaison Department). When the PID was dissolved in 1943 PWE continued to 
                                                     
93
 Political Warfare Executive. Recommendations by the Executive Committee, 1/9/1941, PRO, FO 
898/10, p. 1. 
94
 The Executive Committee’s Proposals for the Organisation and Conduct of Political Warfare, 
undated [August 1941], PRO, FO 898/10. 
95
 Ibid.; Cruickshank 1977, pp. 21-6; Howe 1982, p. 50; Briggs 1995, pp. 32-3. 
 40 
use its title as cover.96 PWE was, since it was a secret organisation, financed on the Secret 
Service Vote.97 
When PWE was founded great confusion still prevailed about which responsibilities 
should belong to whom. In particular the position of the BBC and of the various intelligence 
bodies was unclear. A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Sir Leonard Browett was 
therefore charged with making recommendations for the reduction of staffs and with investi-
gating overlapping and duplication in the respective Intelligence Services of the BBC and 
‘The Country’. The so-called ‘Browett Report’ was submitted on 7 November 1941 and led 
to the re-organisation of PWE and the BBC during the winter and spring of 1941/42.98 It 
therefore took a few months until the final structure of PWE had been crystallised. 
PWE was divided into seven regions (Germany, Italy, France, Low Countries, Scandi-
navia, Central Europe and the Balkans) which were each headed by a Regional Director. 
The German Region, which was the largest and most important one, was under the direction 
of Richard Crossman. When he left for North Africa in 1943 he was succeeded by Sir 
Duncan Wilson.99 The Regional Directors had full responsibility for the staff of their region 
which produced both ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda. The staff for ‘white’ propaganda were 
transferred back to London in February 1942 and accommodated at Bush House, the seat of 
the European Services of the BBC. The staff for ‘black’ remained at ‘The Country’. The 
Regional Directors were directly responsible to the Executive Committee for policy. When 
working either at Bush House or at CHQ they were responsible to the official 
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representatives of the Executive Committee to ‘The Country’ (Leeper) and to the BBC 
(Kirkpatrick).100 
Ivone Kirkpatrick fulfilled a central role in PWE’s structure. He was appointed as 
PWE’s manager for political warfare inside the BBC and should be responsible for the 
application of PWE’s general directives. As Manager of the BBC he became a member of 
the Propaganda Policy Committee (consisting of himself, Leeper and Brigadier Brooks), 
which advised Lockhart on policy matters, and was responsible to Lockhart for the output of 
those BBC European Services, which were directed to PWE’s operational area.101 
The Regional Directors were advised by a Central Planning Committee (headed by 
Ritchie Calder) at Woburn, which had the function of working out plans for propaganda op-
erations on the instruction of the Executive Committee, and of analysing and supervising the 
quality of the output of all regions. Its task was also to make suggestions on policy to the 
Executive Committee.102 
Intelligence played a central role in political warfare, since the propagandists had to 
know intimately their target country and its population and therefore needed the latest, 
fullest, and most accurate information. The ‘Browett Report’ proposed that Intelligence 
should also be organised on a regional basis, since ‘propaganda analysis and target research 
are of little use unless in the closest touch with propaganda policy and its execution’. It 
                                                                                                                                                      
field of black propaganda Sefton Delmer had the say. Balfour 1979, p. 95; Howe 1982, pp. 54-7, 
103 footnote 2. 
100
 Report of Sub-Committee [Browett Report], 7/11/1941, PRO, FO 898/10, p. 5; Proposed Action on 
Sub-Committee Report, 21/11/1941, PRO, FO 898/10; Undated agenda, PRO, FO 898/10; Draft 
plan by Rex Leeper for the Political Warfare Executive, 28/8/1941, PRO, FO 898/10, p. 1; 
Cruickshank 1977, pp. 32-3; Howe, p. 51. 
101
 The Executive Committee’s Proposals for the Organisation and Conduct of Political Warfare, 
undated [August 1941], PRO, FO 898/10; Functions of Mr. I. Kirkpatrick, 28/2/1942, PRO, FO 
898/10. 
102
 Draft plan by Rex Leeper for the Political Warfare Executive, 28/8/1941, PRO, FO 898/10, p. 1; 
Report of Sub-Committee, 7/11/1941, PRO, FO 898/10, p. 6; Political Warfare Executive. 
Recommendations by the Executive Committee, 1/9/1941, PRO, FO 898/10, p. 1; Cruickshank 
1977, pp. 32-3. 
 42 
further demanded that the BBC and CHQ Intelligence sections be fused.103 The bulk of 
Intelligence material came from open sources such as the German Press, the Deutsches 
Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) and the Daily Digest of German Broadcasts supplied by the BBC 
Monitoring Service. Other information was derived from the interrogation of prisoners of 
war or from secret sources such as intercepted letters from the war zone, information from 
the Fighting Services and from SIS. Secret Intelligence material was used especially by the 
‘black’ broadcasters.104 
Bruce Lockhart, chairman of the Executive Committee, was responsible for the whole 
work of PWE and for keeping in touch with the Foreign Office, which remained the final 
arbiter on all matters affecting the relation of propaganda policy to the foreign policy of the 
government.105 Rex Leeper was in charge of ‘The Country’ and its secret activities. Since 
propaganda must be linked with strategy, close liaison with the Fighting Services was re-
quired. Dallas Brooks therefore commanded the Military Wing and was responsible for 
liaison with the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Fighting Services 
in general.106 The Liaison Sections of PWE were responsible for liaison with the MoI, the 
MEW, MI5 (counter-espionage) and the Secret Service.107  
In February and March 1942 a major re-organisation of PWE took place. The Ministe-
rial Committee itself had not been a success, for even after the foundation of PWE rivalries 
between Dalton and Bracken continued. Bruce Lockhart therefore urged for the abolition of 
the Ministerial Committee since it would never work without difficulties ‘even if composed 
of angels’. And this it was certainly not. He proposed a committee of two ministers as a 
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compromise, since a single minister was politically impossible. In his eyes it would have 
been the best solution to transfer all control to the Foreign Office.108 Since Dalton could not 
be dismissed, Churchill promoted him to the Board of Trade. Dalton reluctantly left the 
MEW in February 1942. His successor, Viscount Wolmer (later Earl of Selborne) did only 
inherit the responsibilities for subversion (SOE), not those for propaganda. The 
responsibilities of political warfare were assumed, as to policy by the Foreign Secretary, and 
as to administration, by the Minister of Information.109 
The Executive Committee was also abolished and single executive power vested in 
Bruce Lockhart, who, as Director General of Political Warfare, became solely responsible to 
the Ministerial Committee of two on all aspects of PWE work. He thus became ‘the nearest 
thing to a propaganda chief that Britain ever achieved in the Second World War’.110 Bruce 
Lockhart was assisted by a Propaganda Policy Committee consisting of himself as chairman, 
Rex Leeper, Brigadier Dallas Brooks, and Kirkpatrick. The function of this committee was 
advisory only. Leeper was responsible to the Director General for the work and 
administration of ‘The Country’ and also advised on propaganda policy. Brigadier Brooks 
became adviser on strategy and responsible to Lockhart for relations with the Fighting 
Services and for the administration and establishment of Headquarters Staff. As PWE 
Director in the BBC, Kirkpatrick was responsible to Bruce Lockhart for the output of the 
BBC’s European Services. The Regional Directors were responsible for their general 
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functions to Lockhart, for their work at CHQ to Leeper, and for their work in the BBC to 
Kirkpatrick.111 
These new arrangements were retained until the end of the Second World War, when 
PWE was dismantled immediately in the course of demobilisation. Although even the 
foundation of PWE had not been able to eliminate all rivalries and inefficiencies prevailing 
in the British propaganda apparatus, it was an important achievement which greatly 
enhanced the power and sophistication of British propaganda. Yet British propaganda never 
became as centralised as its German counterpart. Bruce Lockhart was anything but a 
dynamic leader in shaping propaganda policies of PWE, and it was therefore possible for 
sub-ordinate propagandists to seize the initiative.112 
There was one important reason why Duff Cooper, Dalton, Eden and Bracken were 
jockeying for the control of propaganda. It was largely political: they hoped that the war-
time command of the propaganda machine would secure them personal influence and a 
strong position in post-war Britain. Propaganda at that time still enjoyed the mystique which 
had surrounded it during the First World War, and the control of it seemed still very much 
worth fighting for.113 There was yet another reason: the control of propaganda became the 
subject of rivalries between Labour and Conservative politicians. This is well documented 
in a letter by Bruce Lockhart to Eden: 
[...] The Labour Party have a strong interest and a strong belief in political 
warfare and have a claim to be represented on PWE. They are determined that 
Mr Bracken, whom they describe as ‘the Tory thug’, shall not have control.  
They would be content if you were to assume full responsibility with a Par-
liamentary Under-Secretary to run PWE for you. 
They do not want a Committee of Three. If you do not wish to accept this 
task, they would like a separate Ministry with a separate Minister. 
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These views, I imagine, are sponsored by Dr. Dalton. [...] But I am told that 
opposition to Mr. Bracken is strong, and that Major Attlee, who has been 
shown copies of Mr. Bracken's letters to Dr. Dalton, will represent this 
opposition to Mr. Churchill. [...]114 
In the end it was the ‘Tory thugs’ at the Foreign Office and Ministry of Information 
that won the battle. Dalton was promoted to the Board of Trade. ‘He could not be kicked out 
but he could be kicked upstairs.’115 From then on Eden and Bracken, both Conservatives, 
divided their tasks regarding PWE. 
 
3. British radio propaganda under the guidance of PWE 
3.1. The re-organisation of the BBC’s German Service in 1941/42 and its rela-
tions with PWE 
Shortly after the foundation of PWE the BBC’s European Services underwent a 
fundamental re-organisation during the autumn and winter of 1941/42. Department EH/SO1, 
and in particular Crossman, had long been critical of the German Service, and a good many 
critics also came from outside. Most criticism referred to the lack of co-ordination between 
news and talks on the one hand and features on the other, but also to the low quality of the 
German programmes, which, resulted from bad organisation.116 Even before the foundation 
of PWE an internal SO1 report described the appalling working conditions of the BBC’s 
German Service and demanded complete re-organisation.117 
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Kirkpatrick, the Foreign Adviser of the BBC, was appointed Controller (European 
Services) after the foundation of PWE. He argued that the key to improving the 
effectiveness of the European Services was to create a central command for policy which 
would be more willing to follow PWE’s instructions than in the past. What was needed was 
a regional pattern of organisation which would roughly coincide with that of PWE. The 
European Services should also be detached from the rest of the Overseas Services, since 
they had to fulfil special tasks during the war. On 9 October 1941 a new European division 
was announced by the Director-General and Kirkpatrick was made its Controller. The 
European Service came under policy control of PWE, while the Overseas Service continued, 
with greater freedom, to broadcast to the rest of the world.118 
Kirkpatrick began to dismantle the complicated functional structure of the European 
Services and to replace it by a regional organisation. Noel Newsome, the European News 
Editor, was made Director of European Broadcasts and became responsible for conveying 
PWE instructions to the staff by means of internal BBC directives. The Regional Editors, 
who headed the individual language sections, were responsible to him for the output of their 
respective sections. At a weekly meeting between the BBC’s Regional Editors and the 
Regional Directors of PWE the directives drawn up by the PWE Regional Directors were 
discussed.119 
The German Features Unit under Walter Rilla, which had conducted an independent 
existence, was also re-organised. In September 1941 Rilla was replaced by Marius Goring, 
who was put in charge of all German programme production. The German News Editor, 
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Hugh Carleton Greene, became German Regional Editor and was put in charge for the 
whole of the German output, including news.120 
Kirkpatrick played a key role in the relations between PWE and the BBC. As PWE 
Controller in the BBC he was responsible to the Executive Committee for the sections of the 
BBC concerned with propaganda to PWE’s operational area. Newsome was responsible to 
Kirkpatrick for the co-ordination of the output of the Regions, but the Regional Editors were 
free to select and present items for news bulletins within the general framework laid down 
by him. The Regional Directors of PWE, on the other hand, had to obtain Kirkpatrick’s 
approval before sending their weekly directives to the Executive Committee and the BBC 
Regional Editors. Any differences between the European News Editor or the Regional 
Editors of the BBC, and the Regional Directors of PWE had to be resolved by the Controller 
and in the last resort by the Executive Committee.121 
Although the Regional Directors were responsible for ensuring that the BBC output 
conformed with PWE policy, they had no authority to give orders to the corresponding BBC 
Regional Editor, but had to put them through the Controller or his deputy. Newsome was 
often accused by PWE of disregarding their directives in the daily ones which he issued to 
his staff. Kirkpatrick had also to prevent Newsome from imposing his own ideas on the 
German Service.122 
During the first months Kirkpatrick bitterly complained that the Regional Directors of 
PWE ignored him and passed on instructions to the Regional Editors of the BBC without 
consulting him. ‘The Regional Directors appear to think that they are dictators in charge of 
the BBC staff of the regions. They may be right on this count, but it makes orderly staff 
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administration out of question.’123 Much of the tensions between the BBC and PWE also 
resulted from the antagonism between Kirkpatrick and Leeper. Kirkpatrick refused to carry 
out PWE policies and Leeper’s staff did not recognise Kirkpatrick’s authority in the BBC: 
What ought to have been a marriage has, in fact, been an attempted rape, 
and Mr. Kirkpatrick, so far from being a willing victim, has put a barbed-wire 
entanglement around his defences. Policy has suffered from an internecine 
warfare which might well be entitled ‘No time for Hitler’.124 
Despite the re-organisation of the BBC initiated by him, Kirkpatrick was never able to 
achieve the degree of centralised control which he had aimed for. The strong personality of 
Hugh Carleton Greene prevented the German Service from being taken over by PWE. Kirk-
patrick himself, although a Foreign Office official, also became a defender of the BBC’s 
independence. The position of the European Service was further strengthened when Bruce 
Lockhart invited Kirkpatrick to become a member of the Propaganda Policy Committee of 
PWE in 1942 where he became directly involved in the formulation of propaganda policy at 
the highest level. The German Service was far from simply carrying out PWE directives, for 
the editorial staff insisted on their right to argue about the content of particular PWE 
directives. The European news editors enjoyed a relative freedom in writing their news, as 
long as they followed the policy laid down by Newsome’s daily directives. They wrote to 
produce an impact on the audience and were only subject to a general policy control, 
whereas all the Home News had to be approved by the War Office which had a negative 
impact on their quality. The degree of freedom and initiative in the European Service 
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generated energy and stimulated imagination which had a positive effect on the quality of 
the programmes.125 
Although PWE directives were in theory binding on the BBC, in practice the BBC 
was often forced to depart from what had been agreed because daily news rarely respected 
weekly directives. Since the BBC broadcast directly on a large scale it had to handle the 
news immediately as it came through and could not wait until it received instructions from 
PWE. It was also a matter of pride to all BBC staff to get the news on the air in the briefest 
possible time after it had been collected at the Central Desk from Newsome. It was 
impossible for PWE to control Newsome’s directives and daily news conferences, and PWE 
therefore had no part to play in the selection and presentation of news.126 But since PWE 
staff concerned with ‘white’ propaganda were moved from Woburn to the European 
broadcasters in Bush House in February 1942, it was also possible to discuss urgent changes 
to central directives informally.127 
 
3.2. The ‘black propaganda empire’ of Sefton Delmer 
Under Sefton Delmer, who arrived in Woburn shortly before the foundation of PWE, 
the work of the clandestine radio stations was completely re-organised. He not only 
introduced a new concept of black propaganda, he also managed to operate quite 
independently from PWE. ‘Black’ propagandists were much less restricted than their ‘white’ 
colleagues because their output did not bear the signature of the British government. Delmer 
created his private ‘black’ propaganda kingdom at Woburn, where he became very much his 
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own ruler. He emerged as a major personality in the secret department, and PWE never 
intended to put anyone in charge to control him.128  
The success of the ‘black’ radio stations depended largely on Delmer’s inspiration. 
‘Delmer was the nearest thing to a genius which PWE produced. In fact, in his particular 
line he was a genius.’129 His own intimate experience of Germany and the Germans was a 
very important factor. He had been brought up in Berlin, the son of Australian parents, and 
after the family had returned to Britain in 1917 he continued to spend most of his school 
holidays in Germany. Later he worked as a foreign correspondent for the Daily Express in 
Berlin and personally met many of the leading Nazi personalities including Hitler.130 
At Woburn, Delmer had several small teams consisting of native German script-
writers and broadcasters. They were accommodated in requisitioned private houses in the 
surrounding area. These houses were known by letters such as ‘LF’ (Larchfield), or ‘RAG’ 
(The Rookery, Aspley Guise), and their inhabitants were put under the control of a British 
‘Housemaster’ who supervised their life and work. He ensured that his charges obeyed the 
rules, supplied his team with intelligence material needed for their scripts, edited the scripts 
and ensured that when the recordings were made they followed the authorised version.131 
For security reasons the secret stations were referred to in writing or speech only as 
‘Research Units’ (RUs) or by the initials of their houses. In addition, each station was identi-
fied by a letter denoting the language in which it worked and a number to distinguish it from 
other similar language RUs. G.3 thus stood for Gustav Siegfried Eins, G.9 for Deutscher 
Kurzwellsensender Atlantik and Soldatensender Calais, which were Delmer’s largest and 
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most important stations.132 Only a small number of people were allowed to know of their 
existence and the nature of their activities. Even members of the RUs were not informed 
about the existence of other RUs. The RUs worked independently from each other and their 
personnel were housed under conditions of great security. Visits were restricted to people 
with whom they discussed their work, and their names had to be on an approved list. RU 
staffs were not allowed to answer the telephone and the door or to talk to local people.133  
The purpose for this was on the one hand to give each RU the impression that it was 
unique and was alone enjoying the facilities afforded by the British government to state its 
case to its countrymen. On the other hand, it was realised that segregation would prevent 
conscious or unconscious copying of technique and ideas which might have enabled 
listeners to spot that the stations were under the same management. The times at which the 
RUs visited the recording studios were therefore carefully chosen and regulated in order to 
prevent the teams from seeing each other.134 
The recording centre for black broadcasts was known as ‘Simpson’s’. This was 
Wavendon Tower, a large house in the rural village of Wavendon, which was equipped with 
four recording studios. The speakers with their scripts were taken there by car under strict 
security precautions. At first the RUs used two short-wave transmitters near Woburn, but 
they were supplemented in 1943 by a high power medium-wave transmitter.135  
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As a rule transmissions were recorded, but when urgent news demanded an immediate 
broadcast, special permission to transmit live had to be obtained by the security officer and 
the Director of the region in question. The Director, or his deputy, also had to be present 
during a live transmission.136 Security and censorship reasons led to the decision to 
broadcast only pre-recorded material. Live transmissions would have required ‘switch-
censors’ (which were later employed for G.9), whereby a censor controls a switch between 
the speaker and the transmitter, and cuts off broadcasts when objectionable material is being 
spoken. But this method was rather ineffective because it could be too late when the censor 
realised a deviation from a script.137 
In the spring of 1941 SO1 worked out a scheme for broadcasting on enemy and 
enemy-controlled wave-lengths. The scheme involved the purchase of an existing 500-kW 
transmitter, called ‘Aspidistra’, in America and was approved by Churchill on 17 May 1941. 
Although it had not been intended in 1941 to use the transmitter for black transmissions it 
was Delmer who eventually ‘acquired’ the transmitter for his purposes. The transmitter, 
which was one of the most powerful broadcasting instruments in the world, was not put 
under the control of the BBC but of the secret department in Woburn. At that time 
Department EH had no control over the BBC’s European Services and was hardly 
represented inside the BBC. The purchase of ‘Aspidistra’ led to many inter-departmental 
squabbles between the BBC, the MoI, the Air Ministry, and the Wireless Telegraphy Board, 
which finally decided in favour of PWE.138 ‘Aspidistra’ was located in the Ashdown Forest 
near Crowborough in Sussex, but no broadcasts were made there. Instead, direct lines 
connected the transmitter with the BBC (which was supposed to use the transmitter to 
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reinforce its external services when it was not required for PWE’s special purposes) and 
with PWE’s new studios at Milton Bryant (which were called ‘MB’ for cover purposes).139  
Deutscher Kurzwellensender Atlantik, Delmer’s most ambitious project which was 
started in the spring of 1943, was to broadcast exclusively live owing to the character of the 
station, and therefore needed more space, time and facilities than were available at 
‘Simpson’s’. For this reason Delmer’s team was moved in February 1943 into the newly-
built recording studios at MB.140 
When Delmer launched Gustav Siegfried Eins in the spring of 1941, his small team 
had plenty of imagination but insufficient first-class intelligence material upon which to 
base their inventions. This improved when Max Braun, a German refugee, was recruited, 
whose task became to read even most obscure local German newspapers with great care. He 
initiated a huge card index which contained the names and other particulars of thousands of 
Nazi Party functionaries and ordinary Germans. Delmer now began to set up his own 
intelligence section. Because of his high consciousness of security and discretion he was 
able to gain the respect of the Director of Naval Intelligence and other senior personalities 
of the intelligence sector and was able to ignore PWE’s Directorate of Intelligence because 
he had his own alternative -  and more effective - lines of communication. The Naval 
Intelligence Directorate (NID) at the Admiralty was the first of the major intelligence 
directorates to realise the usefulness of Delmer’s in the war against the German U-boats, and 
from 1943 onwards his organisation could be described as one of the NID’s operational 
outposts. The RAF Intelligence Directorate began to employ him a little later.141 From 1943 
Delmer had at MB his own aerial photographic interpretation section (for the evaluation of 
pictures of bombed areas in German towns), a radio monitoring service, a direct telephone 
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line to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre and a Hellschreiber (a wireless 
teleprinter receiving set) to receive the DNB press releases and routine Propaganda Ministry 
directives at the same time as they were received by German newspapers. Delmer’s 
intelligence section was so highly efficient and staffed with such able individuals, that 
Delmer was sometimes accused of having had unauthorised access to top secret material.142  
Delmer’s staff increased tremendously for the operation of G.9. Apart from his old 
staff from Gustav Siegfried Eins he received additional staff and, above all, a large number 
of German prisoners of war who had been carefully selected by PWE. Captured officers 
from German U-boats were of particular value since they knew the latest U-boat jargon and 
could provide detailed descriptions of the local topographies of the U-boat bases and other 
minor details. Individuals from the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht were also recruited for 
Delmer. The campaign against the U-boats could thus be based on an intimate knowledge of 
every aspect of life at sea which was derived from an increasingly skilled interrogation of 
captured U-boat men.143  
It was this professionalism of the organisation and programmes of Delmer’s ‘black’ 
radio stations, which made them so successful in gaining a large audience, for they 
obviously hit exactly upon the taste of the German soldiers and population. 
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Part Three: 
Objectives and Strategies of British Radio Propaganda 
1. Aims, propaganda policy and programme structure of the BBC’s ‘white’ 
propaganda 
1.1. The BBC as the official voice of the British Government: target audiences, 
objectives and propaganda policy 
The BBC’s broadcasting to Germany was probably the most difficult and unrewarding 
of all its activities during the war. Nazi Germany presented a special problem to the propa-
gandists: the problem of the totalitarian state. During the years preceding the war the Nazis 
had monopolised all channels of communication with the intention of eliminating 
information undesirable to their regime. Nazi control of the media (press, books, films, 
newsreels) was almost complete. The only medium of which the Nazis did not possess 
absolute control was radio, since jamming generally proved ineffective against incoming 
broadcasts; yet the sale of the cheap Volksempfänger (People’s Radio Set) was aimed at 
restricting the reception of foreign stations. Physical communication with the Germans was 
therefore difficult, but psychological communication presented an even more complex 
problem. The Third Reich was a police state in which all aspects of life were supervised by 
state agents (Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst and others). The Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung 
had eliminated open opposition against the regime which could have been an effective target 
of the propagandists.144  
As a consequence a large majority of Germans had become politically disinterested. 
The excessive use of propaganda by the Nazis had made them immune to any attempts to in-
fluence them politically, which meant that British propaganda had to be very different  
from Nazi propaganda in order to make any impression at all. Those who did listen 
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obviously distrusted the Nazi propaganda, but at the same time many remained sceptical of 
the voice of the enemy.145 
All these factors made it very difficult for the BBC to convey its message to the Ger-
man people. The BBC’s primary task was to present the policies of the British government 
and the British point of view on the war. Especially during the first two years of the war, 
when Britain was suffering one defeat after another, this was very unrewarding. The only 
way to get an audience in Germany was therefore to provide the Germans with accurate 
information which was being withheld from them by their own news service. But at the 
same time the supply of news could be used for propaganda purposes: 
Our propaganda is not meant to entertain, enlighten or amuse the Germans. 
It exists not for their benefit, but for our own. It must, of course, be attractive 
(‘mit Speck fängt man Mäuse’). [...] It must depress as well as impress. It must 
promote despair, and yet leave room for hope. [...] We must tell them that we 
and our Allies are, of course, fighting for ourselves, but that we are also 
fighting for a new European order.146 
Two overriding principles - truth and consistency - formed the basis of all BBC 
propaganda: ‘Do not say anything which you do not believe to correspond with the facts as 
known to you; and secondly, do not say anything to one country, or audience, which is or 
looks inconsistent with what you are saying to any other country or audience.’147 The BBC 
realised that many people were listening to programmes which were not explicitly intended 
for them because they were likely to be suspicious of propaganda. A good deal of cross-
listening went on, therefore, in Europe, so that listeners would check what was said on the 
BBC Home Service and compare it with what was said on the German Service and on other 
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foreign language services. Inconsistencies had to be avoided as they were likely to reduce 
the credibility of both services.148 
The BBC’s objective during the first years of the war, when the Allies were on the de-
fensive, was to build the greatest possible audience in Europe. It was hoped that the early 
catastrophes could be survived and that the tide of the war would eventually turn in favour 
of Britain. No attempt was therefore made to deny or minimise early disasters. They were 
openly admitted as if they were derived from the enemy Headquarters itself. But it was 
always stressed that the present German successes could make no difference to the ultimate 
end: the victory of the Allies. In reporting truthfully Britain’s defeats as well as her 
successes, the BBC gained considerable credibility, which indicates the reason for its 
popularity during the later stages of the war.149 
However, the BBC was often criticised by the government for broadcasting news 
disadvantageous to Britain. The BBC always held that once a foreign news agency had 
published a piece of information it would endanger the credibility of the BBC if it did not 
refer to it in its own news bulletins. Accuracy and comprehensiveness therefore were the 
characteristics of the BBC wartime news. When it happened that wrong information was 
broadcast, it was corrected with apologies as soon as it was discovered.150 
Throughout the war, the BBC and the British government disagreed about two major 
issues: firstly, whether to draw a distinction between Nazis and Germans, and secondly, the 
refusal of the government to make a clear statement of war aims. Since the BBC was the 
official voice of the British government, it was vital for the propagandists to be well-
informed about the government’s policy towards Germany. A memorandum stated in 1939: 
‘Propaganda is an instrument of policy; policy is an expression of purpose. There can be no 
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useful propaganda without a clear policy, no clear policy without defined purpose.’151 Al-
though there was no doubt of Britain’s determination to defeat Germany, the government re-
fused to make definite statements of its post-war policy towards Germany. The BBC 
therefore felt deprived of valuable propaganda material which was regarded as vital for the 
conduct of political warfare.152 One observer stated in 1940: 
British propaganda as an instrument of British war policy, suffers from the 
fact that it is not, or only to a very small degree, able to conceal its destructive 
character behind constructive and forward-looking aims. [...] It has few 
weapons for making moral conquests in enemy territory.[...] The enemy expects 
no good advice from his enemy; such advice only makes him suspicious. What 
he does expect is knowledge of his opponents will and power. [...]153 
During the first two years there were two reasons - an external and an internal one - 
why the British government was reluctant to state any definite war aims. The first reason 
was the uncertainty of Britain’s ability to win. Richard Crossman wrote on 3 November 
1941: 
Direct appeals, either to hope or fear, are futile in a phase of the war when 
Germany is winning military victories. In such a phase we must limit ourselves 
to the humbler task of building and maintaining an audience (i.e. saying things 
which interest them) and at the same time depressing and dismaying them by 
indirect means. [...] 
Some of our critics want us to adopt the direct appeal to fear. But you 
cannot threaten a man successfully unless you can back your threats with action 
at least as great. We are not able to do this.154 
The government was also cautious not to make any statements concerning the 
treatment of Germany because after the First World War Britain had been accused of having 
made promises for a new post-war world which had not been kept by the Allies. To define 
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British policy towards Germany during the war would have made it easy for the Nazis to 
condemn British post-war plans as just another case of trickery.155 
The other reason was that the British government and public were divided over the 
question of whether or not the German people should be identified with its Nazi leadership. 
In 1938 it was widely expressed that the war should be presented as a war of ideas, ‘in every 
sense of the phrase a battle between democracy and totalitarianism, free thought and con-
trolled thought’, and that it would be essential to make a clear distinction between the Nazi 
government and the German people and to stress that Germany would receive full justice 
after the overthrow of the regime.156 Yet this view did not go unchallenged. The differences 
of opinion were not restricted to any political or social group but went through all strata of 
society. On the one side were those who were chary of not condemning the German people 
as a whole, on the other side were the advocates of ‘Vansittartism’, who saw National 
Socialism as a deeper problem of the German character and as a consequence of Prussian 
militarism. Their aim was to eliminate the German character as a whole.157 
The German Service never supported ‘Vansittartism’, and the tenor of its broadcasts 
during the first years of the war was that Britain was not fighting a war against the German 
people, but against the Nazi regime. Crossman and Greene were in broad agreement that, in 
contrast to government policy, it was important to encourage opposition against Hitler in 
Germany and to exploit every sign of disunity between the regime and the population.158 A 
news talk by Hugh Carleton Greene in October 1941 demonstrated this attitude: 
Friede mit dem deutschen Volk: jawohl! Friede mit Hitler: niemals! Friede 
mit irgendeinem Vertreter des Hitler-Systems: niemals! Friede mit dem 
Herrenklub: niemals! Friede mit den Großindustriellen: niemals! Friede mit den 
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Reichsmarschällen, General-Feldmarschällen, Generalen:  niemals! Selbst 
wenn es zwanzig Jahre dauern sollte, um Hitler und seine Kriegsmaschine zu 
Staub zu zermalmen!159 
In the course of 1942, the British government, which in itself had been divided as to 
the attitude to be adopted towards Germany, could agree on some characteristics which a 
settlement with Germany must include. These were the destruction of Nazi tyranny, 
disarmament and the punishment of war criminals. There was, however, no intention to 
discriminate against Germany economically. The British policy thus did not depart 
considerably from the doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’, which was announced at the 
Casablanca Conference on 24 January 1943. Although the Allies agreed that Germany must 
surrender unconditionally, this did not mean the destruction of the German people as a 
whole, but the aim was to eliminate Germany’s potential war power and the philosophy of 
hate and subjugation.160 
The advantage of the Casablanca formula was that it relieved the British government 
form the necessity of defining its war aims. But at the same time it limited the scope of 
political warfare, for no encouragement for the overthrow of the regime could be given, 
because the Casablanca doctrine included the decision not to make concessions to any 
alternative political group inside Germany. Crossman, Newsome and Greene were unhappy 
about this policy, because it made it impossible to offer any assurance about the way 
Germany would be treated after the overthrow of the Nazi regime. Furthermore, 
‘unconditional surrender’ demanded not only the overthrow of ‘Nazism’ but also of 
‘militarism’, yet the only people in a position to overthrow Nazism were themselves 
‘militarists’.161 
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During the last two years of the war the BBC was left without any positive 
propaganda policy. In particular it was forbidden to make any specific promises about the 
treatment of Germany after the war, and therefore the German Service had to resort to two 
themes: the inevitability of Allied victory, and the integrity and humanity of the democratic 
world in contrast to the corruption and cruelty of the Nazi regime. Yet this implied the just 
and decent treatment of Germany after surrender and was thus a positive aspect. The 
Germans were presented with the alternatives of unconditional surrender to Anglo-American 
mercy and justice, or to continued resistance.162 
Throughout the war the BBC had three main objectives. Firstly, to depress the 
German people and to convince them that it was hopeless to continue the war against the 
superior power of the Allies. Secondly, to drive a wedge between the German population 
and the Nazi Party and to stir up a revolt against Hitler and his associates. The third aim, 
however, tried to compensate for the negative implications of the first two and aimed at 
giving hope to the German population by pointing out the advantages of an Allied victory 
and stressing that Germany would receive fair treatment.163 
The first aim was to be largely achieved by broadcasting straight news items which 
showed up the superiority of the Allied war machine, and by stressing that Germany could 
not possibly win because of the inferiority of its own war machine. A basic policy was to 
play on the fears of the Germans and to stimulate the desire for Allied victory, which would 
be preferable to a prolongation of war.164 
The second aim essentially needed a clear distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Ger-
mans, a definition of war-guilt and a declaration of Allied war aims. It was not enough to 
claim that all Germans were equally responsible for what was being done by the Nazis, be-
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cause then the only thing for them would be to fight to the end. It was important to give 
them some hope, which would it make it worth while to overthrow the regime. But it was 
exactly this point which the government did not want to specify.165 Until 1943 the BBC 
constantly called the German people to do something against the regime in order to prove 
their innocence. It would not be enough to be hostile to the regime inwardly, but the 
individual had to take some active steps.166 In the talks series Frage und Antwort the German 
people was repeatedly called to overthrow the Nazi regime: 
Kein Deutscher soll einmal sagen können, er habe nicht gewußt, worum es 
gehe. Hören Sie Frage und Antwort. [...] 
Frage: Wie kann das deutsche Volk beweisen, daß es das national-
sozialistische Regime nicht mehr unterstützt? Antwort: Das kann nur durch 
Taten geschehen. Und diese Taten müssen vor dem Sturz Hitlers geschehen. Ja, 
nachher wird es zu spät sein. Sie müssen darauf abzielen, den Sturz Hitlers 
herbeizuführen. Churchill hat am 10. Mai erklärt: Die Deutschen werden 
vielleicht daran denken, daß das schurkische Hitler-Regime die Verantwortung 
dafür trägt, daß Deutschland durch Elend und Mord hindurch seinem 
endgültigen Untergang entgegengetrieben wird. Und sie werden vielleicht auch 
daran denken, daß der Sturz des Tyrannen der erste Schritt zur Befreiung der 
Welt ist.167 
After the Casablanca Conference the BBC talked less about what might be done for 
‘good’ Germans, but concentrated on more practical questions such as the punishment of 
war criminals after the war. A precise definition of a war criminal was not given, but the 
mass of the Germans was not identified generally with war criminals. The aim of this was to 
make the individual uncertain about how he would be treated after the war. The BBC’s main 
theme from now on was that the German people must avoid Blutschuld by supporting the 
regime further. It was stressed that the Allies would punish all war criminals, but that they 
would not take collective revenge: ‘Und für alle Deutschen, die keine Schuld auf sich 
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geladen haben, wiederholen wir die Versicherung, die der britische Lordkanzler im Namen 
der britischen Regierung abgegeben hat: Niemals werden wir Engländer Rache nehmen 
durch Massenvergeltung am ganzen deutschen Volk.’168 
The second and the third aims of the BBC were thus closely related. From the 
beginning of the war it was felt that simply to depress the Germans was not enough, but that 
they had to be given some kind of hope and incentive to overthrow the Nazi regime: 
There is clearly a danger that our propaganda will be made to look negative 
and that we shall lose potential supporters among anti-Nazi Germans, the apa-
thetic, faint-hearted and the many who according to our reports are merely 
praying for the quick end to the war, unless we can give a new impetus to our 
picture of ourselves as crusaders in the cause of European freedom.169 
Such a hope could be the promise of a fair post-war settlement and an ‘escape clause’ for 
ordinary Germans who had not committed war crimes. Propaganda should not only 
contribute to winning the war, but also towards solving the problems of peace thereafter.170 
The scope of the BBC’s propaganda was severely limited by the reluctance of the 
British government to state any definite war aims, and later by the Allied policy of 
‘unconditional surrender’. Nevertheless, the German Service found enough ways to point 
out the Allied determination to win and to punish those responsible for the war. Despite the 
Casablanca formula the Germans were called to do something in order to remain innocent, 
and they were presented with a picture of the positive aspects of the democratic and 
humanitarian world. 
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1.2. Programme structure and propaganda techniques 
One striking characteristic of the BBC’s German Service was the great variety of its 
programmes and their extremely high quality. This was not the case from the beginning, but 
developed only during the course of the war, when programme techniques became 
increasingly elaborated and professional. The main programme types were news bulletins, 
news talks and commentaries, and features. 
The German Service consisted of many different programmes addressed to particular 
groups of listeners. It started at five o’clock in the morning with the Workers’ Programme 
presented by Patrick Gordon Walker. This programme dealt with general news and news of 
interest for workers, and devoted itself to reporting on the life of the independent working 
class in democratic countries. An important role was played by the Beveridge Plan of 
December 1942, which proposed a new social order for Britain. It won great popularity 
among British workers, although the government was not pleased about its wide publicity. A 
main topic of the Workers’ Programme was the criticism of National Socialism and its claim 
to have brought a better life to the workers. The workers were called to help shorten the war 
by go-slow methods, although no direct appeals were made. The aim was ‘to ensure that the 
defeatism of the German workers will be active rather than passive’.171 In talks the workers 
were called to decide against Nazism and for peace: ‘Hitler will weiterkämpfen bis zum 
letzten Deutschen. Deutsche Arbeiter müssen wählen: für Hitler sterben oder für 
Deutschland leben.’172 
Other specialised programmes were directed to women, intellectuals, Civil Servants 
and farmers, to the German armed forces, and to Catholics and Protestants. Although the 
basic propaganda content was the same in all programmes, in these special campaigns the 
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themes were selected and presented so as to make the greatest impact on that particular 
target audience. The programmes brought information of special interest to these social 
groups, although it was also realised that not only the intended groups were listening.173 
By far the largest and most important part of the German Service during the war con-
sisted of news bulletins and political commentaries. The view was taken that people who 
were listening through jamming and at the risk of heavy sentences did not want 
entertainment or speculation.174 The BBC thought that straight news was the most effective 
propaganda weapon in a war against a totalitarian state, in which the population was starved 
of uncensored news and wanted to hear what had really happened. The basic principle was 
to give the ‘truth as we see it, not from some bogus propaganda angle’.175 Yet this poses the 
question whether objectivity exists at all. A memorandum of 1941 denied this: 
The question at issue is of course not one of doctoring but of selecting news. 
The selection is determined by a ‘professional estimate of news values’, that is 
presumably by news editors in their capacity as connoisseurs of a political 
criterion and of news values. [...] 
It seems moreover very doubtful whether any such thing as absolute news 
can be provided for any audience, even if those presenting the news are 
actuated only by the love of truth, and have no desire to influence the audience 
one way or another. Even the impersonal tape message has been produced by an 
individual reporter’s choice of subject and of words and of emphasis. [...] 
In brief, personal factors and the limits of time or space make any such thing 
as absolute or ‘straight’ news a chimera. It is obviously in the common interest 
to see that the presentation and necessary modification of news which cannot 
be ‘straight’ is designed to further the end of H.M.G. in the field of Political 
Warfare.176 
Great care was devoted to the news output. The BBC was most anxious that the effect 
of jamming was investigated and measures taken to improve the audibility of news bulletins. 
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It was discovered that even intensive jamming could not render BBC transmissions 
inaudible if the speakers were clear and the presentation simple and straightforward. News 
and talks were therefore simplified in style and the pace of reading reduced. Readers with 
deep voices were preferred and two announcers were employed alternately in the reading of 
news bulletins to maintain the listener’s attention.177 In contrast to Goebbel’s propaganda, 
the news bulletins of the German Service always tried to present the news as objective and 
impartial as possible and to ‘seek to achieve in our presentation of all output a tone of calm 
and sober confidence which will convince any listener that we are 100 per cent certain of 
winning’.178 As a rule, the BBC started its news bulletins with bad news, since this gave an 
impression of frankness and ‘a bulletin that started with bad and went on with good news 
left a better taste in the mouth than one which did the reverse’.179 
Throughout the whole war, the news bulletins (from 1941 every hour) were followed 
by commentaries given by British personalities (Lindley Fraser, Hugh Carleton Greene, 
Richard Crossman, Charles Richardson and others). The peak listening hours in the evening 
were kept clear for general news and commentaries. A basic principle of the BBC was the 
strict separation between news and commentaries. Whereas the news had to be as objective 
as possible, the commentaries should represent the personal view of the commentator, who 
himself represented the views of the government. The commentaries were the real 
propaganda instruments, in which the British war aims (as far as they had been defined) 
were explained.180 F.A. Voigt wrote in 1940: 
The polemical effect of propaganda proper (as distinct from the news), that 
is to say, of the ‘Sonderberichte’, will be heightened if the Bulletins are always 
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severely objective. The German listener will be more likely to feel that even if 
there is hatred in our propaganda, we are scrupulously careful of our facts. [...] 
The Bulletins should, so to speak, be the concrete emplacements for our 
propaganda artillery. It should be hard concrete and of high quality. [...]181 
All programme types were intended to appeal to the emotions of the listener, and 
every theme should be presented in such a way as to affect the personal interests of the 
respective target audiences (e.g. women, workers or soldiers).182 In all programmes allusions 
were made to fears of defeat, to the consequences of a prolonged war, to shortages of food 
and other essentials, to air attacks, to heavy casualties, and to the disintegration of family 
life.183 
The most eminent speaker on the German Service was Thomas Mann who broadcast 
from October 1940 until the end of the war his monthly talks Deutsche Hörer! (at the begin-
ning five, later eight minutes long). They were recorded first in New York and later in Los 
Angeles and sent to London. These talks were intensely polemic and denounced Hitler and 
his regime and the disasters they brought on the  German people and German culture.184 
Mann warned the Germans: ‘[...] With Hitler, peace is impossible because he is from the 
depths of his being incapable of peace, and because this word in his mouth is a soiled, 
diseased lie like every other word ever spoken by him. As long as Hitler and his regime of 
fire-raisers exist, you Germans will have no peace. Never! [...].’185 
Whereas the commentaries were obviously ‘propagandistic’, the features, which made 
up less than 10 per cent of the German output, used more subtle methods of conveying the 
British propaganda message, namely humour and satire. The first features, introduced in the 
autumn of 1940, were rather dry and boring and took the form of dramatic presentations of 
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events of the day. From the winter of 1940/41 a new type of programme was created which 
was a cross between soap opera and political cabaret - satirical programmes which 
chronicled week by week the war experiences of typical Germans and pilloried the Nazi 
leaders for their exaggerations and broken promises. This was a type of programme 
unknown to the German listener and attracted many sympathies. It not only amused 
listeners, but it also showed that the BBC was well informed about everyday life in 
Germany.186 The three most famous satirical features, which were created in the winter of 
1940/41 and ran until the end of the war, were Kurt und Willi, Frau Wernicke and Die Briefe 
des Gefreiten Hirnschal. 
Kurt und Willi became one of the most popular features. It was a dialogue, written in 
Berlin dialect, between Kurt Krüger, a naive secondary school teacher, and Willi 
Schimanski, his cynical friend from the Propaganda Ministry. They met once a week in a 
Berlin café and talked about recent political events and everyday life. Kurt believed 
everything that Nazi propaganda was telling the Germans, whereas Willi, who possessed an 
intimate knowledge of the Propaganda Ministry, deprived him of his illusions. Willi was 
very accurate as a figure of the Propaganda Ministry, as Goebbels himself admitted, for the 
feature was based on secret intelligence material. The ideas came from Norman Cameron, a 
Scottish poet working for PWE, and the feature was written by Bruno Adler, a well-known 
German writer. Both characters were played by German actors, Willi by Peter Ihle 
(Pseudonym: Peter Illing) and Kurt by Kurt Wendhausen.187 Here is an extract of Kurt und 
Willi, which was actually broadcast before D-Day: 
Kurt: Nun sag’ doch mal Willi, natürlich ganz unter uns, was ist denn nun 
eigentlich los mit der Invasion? Willi: Mit welcher Kurt, mit der in der Luft 
oder der in Italien? Kurt: Ach was, ich meine natürlich mit der im Westen. 
Willi: Ach so, du kannst sie wohl gar nicht erwarten, was. Kurt: 
Offengestanden, die Spannung dauert schon so lange, daß es nachgerade eine 
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Wohltat wäre, wenn endlich etwas geschähe. Willi: Ach nee, Kurtchen, 
Invasionsfieber! Auch du, mein Brutuschen!188 
Frau Wernicke was also written by Bruno Adler. This weekly feature was part of the 
Women’s Programme and took the form of a monologue by a typical Berlin housewife who 
gossiped in rich Berlin dialect about the difficulties of daily life, of food and other 
shortages, the endless RAF bombing raids and other less pleasing aspects of a housewife. 
Her part was played by the emigrée actress Annemarie Haase. In a naive way she made fun 
of the Nazi propaganda and developed National Socialist arguments to absurdity. None of 
her stories was without propaganda implication or lacked a subversive aim:189  
Erst konnten sie [die Nazis] nicht genug kriegen, und nun heißt es, wir 
müssen uns einschränken. Na, mit dem Einschränken haben wir ja schon 
angefangen. In der Luft haben wir uns schon eingeschränkt. Da haben wir nicht 
mehr viel zu bestellen. Und auf dem Meer? Da ist auch nichts mehr zu holen. 
Aber wegen der Scharnhorst, da kippen wir nicht aus den Holzpantinen. Die 
anderen Schiffe sind sowieso schon alle futsch. Was hätte uns denn da das eine 
genützt! Ich frage Sie: wozu braucht der deutsche Mensch Schiffe? Was der 
deutsche Mensch braucht, das ist eine Festung. Und zum Glück haben wir den 
ganzen Kontinent, in den wir eingesperrt sind. Das ist richtig, Frau Kulicke, die 
Festung hat ein paar deftige Löcher abgekriegt. Zieht mächtig rein von Osten 
und von Süden. Und von Westen da weht so ‘ne unangenehme kühle Brise 
‘rüber. Und wenn die von da auch noch ihre Invasion machen, dann müssen wir 
uns auch auf dem Land einschränken. Aber was schadet denn das, Frau 
Kulicke, alles dürfen wir verlieren, das Land, und das Meer und die Luft, wenn 
und nur unser Führer erhalten bleibt! [...]190 
The feature Die Briefe des Gefreiten Hirnschal was brilliantly scripted by Robert Lu-
cas (Ehrenzweig) and modelled on Jaroslav Hasek’s famous Good Soldier Schweik. The 
series took the form of letters which Adolf Hirnschal wrote from the fronts to his beloved 
wife Amalia in Zwieselsdorf and which he read aloud to his friend Jaschke. Hirnschal 
(played by the Viennese actor Fritz Schrecker) was portrayed as a robust and naive character 
coping with the hardships and dangers of the war in Russia, which offered a sharp contrast 
to the bombastic claims of the official Nazi propaganda. With irony and using rich army 
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slang he made fun of the Etappenschweine (base pigs) and Parteibonzen (Party parasites) 
who led a privileged and safe life while the ordinary soldiers had to risk their own lives; or 
he was portrayed as an all-believing and naive man who did not have any doubts of the Nazi 
propaganda although the events obviously proved it to be wrong.191  
These three satirical series were not the only features broadcast on the German 
Service. The opportunities for undermining popular confidence in the claims of the Nazi 
leaders increased as the war progressed and the potential Allied military victory became 
clear, and the BBC fully exploited the exaggerated claims and inconsistencies of German 
propaganda. The weekly programme Sefton Delmer antwortet Hans Fritzsche was one way 
to show the contradictions between the Nazi propaganda and reality. Delmer regularly 
broadcast one or two hours after the star commentator Fritzsche had spoken on the German 
home radio and countered him point by point with irony and sarcasm.192 
But no programme could have been more effective in revealing the failure of the Nazi 
regime than the regular series Hitler versus Hitler. Even before the war the BBC had begun 
to collect recordings of Hitler’s and other Nazi leader’s speeches. As early as 1939 a 
programme was run whose technique was to signal Hitler’s broken undertakings and 
promises by using conflicting extracts from his speeches. Hitler could thus be made to 
contradict himself through his own words. This was particularly effective during 1941, 
because Hitler had promised that the year 1941 would bring the completion of the greatest 
victory in history. The technique of contrasting promise and performance was used to 
increasing effect as the war progressed to show up the contrasts between ‘then’ and ‘now’.193 
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Despite their variety and difference in approach, all programmes had the same objec-
tive: to show the Germans that the Allies were determined to win and that the German war 
machine was about to collapse. Whereas news bulletins made the greatest impact on German 
morale by simply reporting about German losses and Allied victories (from late 1942 on-
wards), the commentaries pointed out why Germany was going to loose the war and called 
the Germans to take active steps against the criminal Nazi regime. The features, however, 
used humour and irony as their weapon of attack and made fun of Nazi ‘values’ and claims. 
 
2. Objectives and technique of Delmer’s ‘black’ radio propaganda 
2.1. Aims, target audiences and techniques of ‘black’ propaganda 
The purpose and strategy of ‘black’ propaganda was totally different from that of its 
‘white’ counterpart. Whereas the BBC tried to convince its audience with facts and 
arguments of the necessity to rise against the Nazi regime, ‘black’ propaganda was purely 
subversive. It was increasingly felt that ‘white’ propaganda alone would not be able to 
weaken the German will to fight. A PWE directive of 1942 stated that 
It is doubtful if any rational approach will be effective in disintegrating this 
unity for self-preservation [of the German people]. For even a harsh and barely 
tolerable statement of war aims (if one were practical) would be dismissed as 
only another trap like Wilson’s Fourteen Points. 
It is believed that the only practicable solution of this problem lies in using 
against the Germans the same purely psychological weapon which they 
employed so effectively against France.194 
‘Black’ propaganda had a few advantages compared with open propaganda which 
made it particularly useful for use in political warfare. A PWE memorandum stated in 1943: 
‘Black’ propaganda is propaganda put out from a source disguised so as to 
cause the news and views disseminated to be readily believed by the public ad-
dressed. 
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Under the cover of speaking from within the enemy countries and in the 
name of the enemy people or a section thereof, ‘black’ propaganda is able to 
put out news and views which, coming from the United Nations, would be 
suspect, but which coming from within the people among whom this news and 
these views gain currency to think and act in a way contrary to the interests of 
the German war effort. [...] 
‘Black’ radio can put out news which H.M.G. does not want for various rea-
sons to put out over official channels. It can put out news of such doubtful 
accuracy that H.M.G., speaking through the B.B.C., cannot sponsor it, but 
which is sufficiently plausible to be believed in the countries addressed and 
which will cause reactions among the public of those countries useful to the 
Allied war effort.195 
Delmer’s view was that attempts to convert the Germans to rebellion against the Nazis 
by argument and appeal was a waste of time. He thought that it would be much more 
efficient to appeal to their patriotic feelings than to their reason. His propaganda was meant 
to be ‘operational’ and to influence the thinking of the Germans to make them behave 
contrary to the Nazi war effort.196 
The success or failure of ‘black’ propaganda depended upon how much the operator 
was able to identify himself completely with his target and to make it seem plausible to his 
audience that the station originated from within the target country. Delmer had a 
phenomenal capacity for penetrating the German mind and mental processes - and  he had as 
official adviser on psychology Dr. John F. MacCurdy, Lecturer in Psychopathology at 
Cambridge University.197 But he possessed yet another characteristic which was essential for 
the conduct of ‘black’ propaganda: he had a great sense of humour. Peter W., who worked 
for Delmer, later said: ‘Unless you have a sense of humour, I don’t think you are really 
useful in black propaganda, because all goes with imagination and invention.’198  
Owing to the nature of clandestine propaganda, the ‘black’ propagandists were much 
more autonomous than their ‘white’ colleagues because the British government was not offi-
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cially responsible for their output. Nonetheless, in 1942 Delmer was heavily criticised by 
Stafford Cripps for the pornographic content of Gustav Siegfried Eins, but PWE defended 
him: 
There is a sadism in the German nature which is quite alien to the British 
nature and German listeners are very far from being revolted by the sadistic 
content of some of these broadcasts. The official in charge of this station 
[Delmer] has an intimate understanding of German psychology and has only 
introduced coarse realism into the broadcasts in so far as it is likely to assist the 
subversive purpose of the station. [...] No secret, subversive organisation can 
operate successfully if its operations are to be limited to what the moral 
standards of our country would require for the work undertaken openly and in 
the name of H.M.G.199 
But on the whole, Delmer was not restricted by any British ‘moral standards’ and 
broadcast over the ether whatever he wanted - which was indeed sometimes aesthetically of-
fensive. 
 
2.2. The objectives and programme structure of Gustav Siegfried Eins 
Gustav Siegfried Eins (GS1), Delmer’s first secret station which began broadcasting 
on 23 May 1941, was a genuine ‘black’ station pretending to be of German origin. It 
masqueraded as a station run by a dissident officer inside Germany.200 Delmer described the 
purpose of GS1 as following: 
The objective of LF is subversive. We want to spread disruptive and disturb-
ing news among the Germans which will induce them to distrust their 
government and disobey it, not so much from high-minded political motives as 
from ordinary human weakness [...]. 
We are making no attempt to build up a political following in Germany. We 
are not catering for idealists. Our politics are stunt. We pretend we have an ac-
tive following to whom we send news and instructions. The purpose of this is to 
provide ourselves with a platform from which to put over our stuff. We 
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therefore make no attempt to provide our listeners with a political 
programme.201 
The broadcasts of GS1 were exclusively negative, their aim being to destroy faith in 
the Nazi regime by spreading rumours and to awaken a critical sense by providing the 
necessary material - scandal, corruption, tyranny of the Party bigwigs and crying 
injustices.202 The broadcasts were intended equally for the armed forces and for the home 
front, and in particular for the traditionally conservative and nationalistic Germans. The 
station purported to be motivated by purely nationalistic and anti-Bolshevist sentiments and 
aimed at purging Germany from the enemy within. The object was to stimulate distrust of 
the Nazi bosses, the SS and the administration in general, and to cause friction between the 
Party and the Army.203 
Gustav Siegfried Eins went on the air on two frequencies every hour at twelve 
minutes before the hour, broadcasting for twelve minutes, from 6.48 p.m. to 3.48 a.m. (prior 
to 1943 it broadcast every 7 minutes before the hour from 5.53 p.m. to 1.53 a.m.). The 
transmissions varied from one new broadcast per day to two or three per week, depending 
on the subversive value of the material and the degree of enemy interference. As a rule, all 
transmissions were from recorded material and the same broadcast was repeated every hour, 
so that listeners could chose the time that suited them best. This was also the most efficient 
method for overcoming heavy jamming. The place from which the transmissions were made 
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was never stated, but GS1 consistently pretended to be a German station.204 In 1943 it 
broadcast 36.25 hours per week, which was more than the German Service of the BBC.205 
Every broadcast began with a musical signal which was the second bar of a German 
folk song. The first bar ‘Üb immer Treu und Redlichkeit...’ (Be Always True and Righteous) 
was used by the German home radio; the second bar went ‘...bis an dein kühles Grab’ 
(‘...until you reach your cool grave’). Two voices were used on the station. The broadcasts 
were given by Der Chef, who was always announced by his adjutant. GS1 did not broadcast 
news in the traditional sense, but its broadcasts took the form of talks, each being devoted to 
an attack on one target only. Der Chef stated mysteriously at the beginning ‘49 transmits si-
multaneously, if possible’ and  evoked the impression that he addressed his speeches to key-
men of a secret organisation of military character.206 By this and other devices the station 
tried to give the impression that Der Chef spoke to a large organisation from which he 
received inside information on military and party affairs inside Germany.207 The listeners 
were intended to feel they were eavesdropping on the private wireless service of a secret 
organisation whose members presumably knew what the programme of the organisation 
was. The name Gustav Siegfried Eins was deliberately chosen by Delmer in order to confuse 
the audience. Its exact meaning remained unclear (Geheimsender I, Generalstab I, or 
Gurkensalat I ?).208 Delmer called the speaker Der Chef because he had learned while 
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travelling through Germany before the war that Hitler’s inner circle spoke of him as der 
Chef. On GS1 Der Chef was formally announced by his adjutant, for in those days every 
high-ranking Nazi was invariably accompanied by an adjutant acting as his personal 
assistant.209 
Der Chef appeared as a hard-hitting and judicious spokesman for national affairs.  He 
purported to be a tough Prussian, patriotic and disgusted by the corruption and depravity 
prevailing in his country under the Nazi regime. In both manner of speaking and his 
phraseology he leaned towards the language used and appreciated by the front-line soldiers. 
The broadcasts did not contain a running commentary on the war. Instead they offered 
‘sensational’ inside information. Der Chef seemed well-informed and his arguments were 
hard to refute.210 
An American Intelligence report (which indeed believed GS1 to be a German station) 
described in 1943 the characteristics of Der Chef: 
The Chief is an enemy of the Nazi party, the Nazi bureaucracy from top to 
bottom, but above all, the SS. Interestingly, the word ‘Nazi’ and ‘National So-
cialism’ are never used. Instead the Chief speaks of the ‘commune’ which, 
more specifically, stands for all those ‘blunderers’, ‘war profiteers’ and 
‘pompous asses’ of the Party who sit in decisive and responsible administrative 
and executive offices and by their selfishness torpedo the efforts of the 
homeland and the sacrificial courage of the front [...].211 
Der Chef was anti-Communist and strongly supported the war against Russia but was 
critical of its conduct. He denounced the dark influence of the Party in the operations of the 
German Navy and Air Force. He had once been a supporter of Hitler but was now appalled 
at the corruption, godlessness, profiteering, selfishness, clique rivalries and Party-above-all 
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system which the Party had established.212 The Parteikommune was GS1’s blanket 
expression for the Nazi Party Apparat, meaning the vast number of individuals who were 
apparently exempt from military service and lived at the cost of the ordinary and patriotic 
Germans. Der Chef bitterly complained about the Parteikommune and all others who were 
leading Germany in the direction of inevitable defeat.213  
The party officials were described as greedy, immoral, ruthless parasitic individuals 
who exploited their power for selfish ends and behaved as incompetent cowards at the front 
- if they ever showed up. Himmler, Zeitzler, Rommel, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and SS-leader 
Sepp Dietrich were frequently attacked. Der Chef concentrated his attacks especially on the 
lesser-known local leaders. Hitler himself, as well as Göring, were at first exempted from 
any attack because many Germans identified themselves with the Führer. From the summer 
of 1942 onwards he was also attacked. GS1 seemed to be extremely well informed about 
inside events and major personnel changes and often released news of them weeks before 
the Germans themselves.214 
Delmer hoped that GS1’s intriguing stories would soon be circulating among the Ger-
man soldiers and the civilian population. He knew from his Daily Express days that the 
public denunciation of vices was particularly attractive to audiences. Delmer therefore used 
deliberately pornographic elements in these broadcasts in order to attract listeners and gain 
their attention for the main objects of the station (i.e. undermining confidence in the 
regime). In the early days of the station this element was quite strong, but later, when 
evidence grew that GS1 was widely listened to, it was reduced and replaced by barrack-
room slang. For Delmer’s recipe proved to be an immediate success. A report from Sweden 
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stated that the station had become more serious in 1942 and had collected a huge audience 
which faithfully followed its broadcasts. Delmer always took great care not to let it seem 
that Der Chef enjoyed the details of what he revealed about the sexual excesses of Party 
elites. He always left the end to the imagination of the listener.215 Here is an account of such 
an ‘erotic’ broadcast: 
On the 7th a rather old-fashioned piece about the SS being put on the job of 
race preservation at home, helping wives and widows and sweethearts of fallen 
soldiers, prisoners and even soldiers unable to come on leave to have the 
children which their own men would have provided them with normally. A 
detailed account of a meeting at the Neuer Welt in Berlin when the wives and 
sweethearts of soldiers and prisoners from the Berlin gas works were 
introduced to SS men and what the SS men had to say about their adventures. 
The Neuer Welt entertainment did actually take place and we have the account 
of the Lokal-Anzeiger to give us the necessary background.216 
GS1 launched varying campaigns to spread dissatisfaction among different social 
groups. General corruption and Black Market Trading was to be encouraged by showing ex-
amples of high profit; desertion was to be encouraged by descriptions of the inefficiency of 
Gestapo and SS and of successful cases of desertion. Other campaigns were aimed at factory 
workers, peasants, the Air Force, the Wehrmacht or U-boat crews. Attacks on the morale of 
soldiers were usually based on reports of SS and Party officials who were having a good 
time far from the dangers of the front and were profiteering at the cost of the ordinary 
soldiers.217 
A report on GS1’s output of January and February 1942 may give an impression of 
what was broadcast on this station in general: 
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We continued our campaigns: 1) to undermine the morale of troops resting 
from or about to be sent back to the Eastern front; 2) to encourage desertion; 3) 
to undermine airforce morale; 4) to undermine naval morale; 5) to undermine 
factory workers’ morale; 6) to cause friction between the Army and Party; 7) to 
cause friction between Germans and the foreign soldiers and workers 
collaborating with them. [...] A feature of all broadcasts was the very 
considerable amount of accurate or nearly-accurate factual material used. 
Campaign 1 was supported with protests against i) the poor equipment of 
troops sent to Finland (Jan. 25th); ii) malingerers who escaped front-line 
service, giving full details of the methods by which they tricked the doctors 
(Jan. 28th); iii) troops from the Eastern Front being treated as though they were 
demoralised and being put into concentration camp-like training centres under 
SS guards (Jan. 29th); iv) wounded soldiers from the East being arrested for not 
saluting stay-at-home SS officers (Jan. 30th). 
Campaign 2 had a special broadcast on the 7th showing that 8,493 men have 
successfully deserted and that the Army and Party are powerless to prevent de-
sertion. 
Campaign 3: Air Force grouses about lack of transport, fuel and planes, fa-
vouritism and difficult flying conditions were voiced on February 1st to provide 
pretexts for bad performance. On 4th there was a special talk on Koch, who 
was said to be using transport planes to carry food and loot while the army and 
airforce were in need of supplies. Deutschlandsender provided most 
satisfactory confirmation of our report that Koch had looted the Kieff godless 
museum by reporting on that relics had disappeared from this museum. 
Campaign 4: The German passage of the channel was used to demand better 
training for U-boat crews to help Campaign 5 by again putting out our rumour 
that factory technicians who distinguished themselves by their performance 
were being drafted as specialists for U-boat crews. 
Campaign 6 had a special broadcast on the 7th, in which we protested 
against the punitive transfer of Oberstleutnant von Harbou, Falkenhausen’s 
Chief of Staff, because he had refused to promote Party functionaries. On the 
17th there was a mock recruiting appeal for the SS. 
Campaign 7: The anti-foreigners campaign was carried on by broadcasts on 
the 5th, 6th and 19th February. Directed chiefly against the Italians but also the 
other countries helping Germany on the military side. On the 22nd foreign 
workers were attacked for bringing disease into the country and eating up the 
food which was needed for the Germans to keep up their vital resistance to 
disease.218 
GS1 continued to broadcast until 18 November 1943, when Delmer decided that Der 
Chef had to die because he needed all resources and personnel for his new ambitious project, 
Deutscher Kurzwellensender Atlantik.219 
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2.3. The aims and programme structure of Deutscher Kurzwellensender 
Atlantik and Soldatensender Calais 
On 22 March 1943 Delmer launched his second big station, Deutscher Kurzwel-
lensender Atlantik which marked a new departure since it was aimed specifically at German 
submarine crews and worked in close conjunction with the Admiralty as a psychological 
weapon in the Battle of the Atlantic. The station was not a brainchild of PWE, but the result 
of the active intervention of the Admiralty’s NID.220 Like GS1, Atlantik did not seek to en-
courage any opposition groups or to provide its audience with a political programme, but 
launched a series of short-term subversive attacks on the enemy.221 A PWE report stated the 
aims of the new station in 1943 as following: 
To undermine the morale of the German forces in Western Europe - particu-
larly of the U-boat crew operating in the Atlantic - by creating alarm in their 
minds regarding conditions at home, by unsettling their faith in their arms and 
equipment and in their leaders, by rationalising bad discipline and performance 
of military duty, and wherever possible by encouraging actual desertion.222 
Atlantik was followed on 14 November by Soldatensender Calais (renamed 
Soldatensender West after the fall of Calais to the Allies in 1944), which broadcast for the 
first time on the 500-kW medium-wave transmitter ‘Aspidistra’. It was more or less based 
on Atlantik’s formula and catered for all three military services, not only for the German 
Navy. Both stations broadcast a large part of their programmes together and were internally 
referred to as ‘G.9’. G.9 was a ‘grey’ station in so far as it did not pretend to be operating 
inside the borders of the Reich, but it was left to the listener’s judgement to decide whether 
it was an enemy station or not. A ‘grey’ station depended above all upon the attractiveness 
of its programme to obtain an audience.223 The name, the programme structure and the 
straight news items were merely used as a cover to make the audience believe that it was 
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listening to a genuine German Forces station or at least to make the listener feel safer and to 
give him an excuse in case he was caught listening.  But if people listened often enough they 
must have picked up on the subversive themes and realised that the station was not an 
official Reich station.224 
When Delmer set up the medium-wave station Calais his plan was also to reach the 
German civilian population which, for the most part, was unable to receive short-wave 
Atlantik broadcasts. In the struggle against the BBC over the use of ‘Aspidistra’ he argued 
that it was time to incite the Germans to take action. The BBC’s task was to give straight 
news and represent the view of the British government, not to cause revolutionary agitation, 
which in any case would have been ineffective coming from the enemy’s voice. The task of 
causing revolutionary action would thus fall to ‘black’ propaganda which purported to speak 
from inside Germany to the Germans from a German point of view.225  
Deutscher Kurzwellensender Atlantik and Soldatensender Calais were the first black 
stations which offered their listeners a non-stop programme from 18.30 (later 17.30) p.m. to 
8 a.m. G.9 played recorded dance music continuously, with short interruptions for ‘features’ 
and news flashes and longer news bulletins of about 15 to 20 minutes. The news bulletins, 
which were a novelty in ‘black’ broadcasting, were broadcast live, even during the night, 
which enabled the station to offer its listeners an up-to-the-minute news service.226 In 1943 
Atlantik was broadcasting 94.5 hours per week, Calais 28 hours.227 
The station tried to win the confidence and the interest of the German Services 
listeners by providing informative news of current events and pleasant entertainment in the 
form of good dance music - such as was no longer played by the German home radio. In 
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fact, the dance music proved to be one of the main attractions of the station and secured a 
large audience who listened also with interest to the ‘news’ which was presented so 
differently from that of Goebbels. No other station catered so successfully for the musical 
taste of the average German soldier, and particular attention was therefore paid to music. It 
played American jazz music sung in German as well as pure German songs. G.9 exploited 
the fact that the younger German soldiers were starved of jazz music which was forbidden in 
Germany. All the music was light, and records were brought in from various countries 
(Germany, France, America, England).228 
The news bulletins consisted of reports from the fronts, from inside Germany and 
from Germany’s allies together with items of special interest to servicemen. A large share of 
‘news’ was drawn from the Hellschreiber which delivered news straight from the official 
German news agencies and thus provided the station with the necessary authenticity. Other 
material was slightly ‘doctored’ for the station’s subversive purposes, and some ‘news’ was 
completely invented. In addition to news a number of human interest stories and sports 
bulletins were included for the purpose of maintaining cover. All news was given without 
commentary, except the special service talks in which the attitude of the speaker was that of 
a man defending the interests of the ordinary serviceman. Regular ‘features’ included talks 
warning U-boat crews against incompetent and reckless commanders, naval greetings and 
reports of air raid damage street by street in German towns.229 The station used the current 
Nazi jargon when talking about the ‘enemy’ (the allies) and interrupted its programme when 
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Hitler or Goebbels spoke on the German home radio. G.9 picked the speeches up from the 
German network and relayed it on its own service.230 
In item after item the station gave examples of the inequality of sacrifice between the 
common man and the privileged Party functionaries. Its aim was also to make the soldiers 
worry about what was happening to their families at home. One main theme of the station 
during the war was desertion. It never gave instructions on how to desert, but it did cite the 
cases of people who had deserted successfully explained in detail how they had managed to 
escape.231 
The station did not demand an end of the war until after 20 July 1944, when the 
‘peace generals’ had given a ‘green light’ with their attack on Hitler. From then on G.9 
called the listeners to avoid any useless fighting and to surrender at the earliest possible 
moment. The following is an extract of a naval talk from 29 April 1945: 
Kameraden, wir haben eben noch mal durchgegeben, wie U-
Bootsbesatzungen aus dem Schwindel herauskommen können. Wir können nur 
hoffen, daß möglichst viele noch von diesen Anweisungen Gebrauch machen, 
damit nicht noch Kameraden ums Leben kommen sechs Minuten nach zwölf, 
denn so weit sind wir doch. Ob jetzt ein paar Stunden früher oder später 
offiziell das ganze haltgeblasen wird, das macht ja keinen Unterschied. Der 
Krieg ist vorbei. Rund 610 U-Boote haben wir verloren bei dem Schwindel. 
Jetzt wollen wir wenigstens dafür sorgen, daß sich die Zahl jetzt nicht unnötig 
erhöht. Wir wollen aller der Kameraden gedenken, die mit diesen über 600 U-
Booten von Feindfahrt nicht zurückgekehrt sind, und aller Kameraden der U-
Bootswaffe, die durch Bomben umgekommen sind im Stützpunkt, und auch vor 
allem derer, die jetzt noch in letzter Minute sinn- und zwecklos gefallen sind in 
Marineeinheiten an Land. [...] Wer auch nur etwas Verstand und 
Verantwortungsgefühl hat, vor allem Verantwortungsgefühl, der wird nicht 
diesen Ehrgeiz [der letzte Gefallene dieses Krieges zu sein] haben. Der Krieg 
ist vorbei. Wir haben uns bei der KM mit einigem Recht immer eingebildet, wir 
sind besonders tüchtige Leute. Tüchtige Leute werden jetzt gebraucht. Und 
zwar für bessere Beschäftigungen wie U-Bootsfahren. Nämlich für den 
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Wiederaufbau. Den friedlichen Wiederaufbau aus den Trümmern, die uns die 
Führung hinterlassen hat!232 
In the weeks before D-Day the main objective had been to concentrate the attention of 
the German soldier on the enemy within (i.e. the Party) rather than on the enemy outside. 
After D-Day the themes were switched to the hopelessness of continuing the war, the folly 
of useless sacrifice, and the incompetence of Germany’s leaders. The soldiers were 
reminded constantly of the disasters of the Eastern front, the decline of the German war 
production, the impotence of the Luftwaffe, the corruption of the Nazi clique and the 
breakdown of the authorities.233 Even a few days before the end of the war G.9 still tried to 
stir up the hatred of Party officials: 
Jeder Trick ist den Parteiflüchtlingen recht, um nur über die Grenze ins 
Ausland zu gelangen. In der Uniform eines DRK-Helfers versuchte der 
Reichshandwerksmeister, SA-Obergruppenführer Ferdinand Schramm, verge-
blich, an den Schweizer Grenzbeamten vorbeizuschlüpfen. Schramm saß am 
Steuer eines LKWs, der ähnlich hergrichtet war wie die Lastwagen des Interna-
tionalen Roten Kreuzes, die in letzter Zeit Lebensmittel für die 
Kriegsgefangenen im Reich hereingebracht hatten. In der Nähe von Rheineck 
erschien der deutsche bevollmächtigte Minister in Kroation, SA-
Obergruppenführer Siegfried Kasche, an der Schweizer Grenze komplett mit 
kroatischen Ausweispapieren und einem Wagen mit ovalem Schild und roten 
Buschstaben ‘CD’ des Diplomatischen Korps. Aber auch das half nichts.234  
Of course, this was pure invention.235 But it sounded - and still sounds - so realistic 
and convincing that it is easy to imagine, even fifty years after the war, how difficult it must 
have been to distinguish between ‘hard facts’ and fabrications.  
G.9 broadcast until 1 May 1945, one week before VE-Day. Then it was stopped for 
there was no sense in maintaining a powerful medium-wave station calling itself 
Soldatensender West at a time when the German war machine was falling to pieces.236 
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Conclusion: 
How Effective was British Radio Propaganda? 
 
At first, like any other message sent out within a communication process, propaganda 
may be regarded as efficient if its content is consciously adopted by the target audience; if, 
in other words, the message has been able to convince the audience with arguments (this 
was certainly the case with the BBC’s ‘white’ propaganda, which was the voice of the 
enemy). But beyond this rational approach one has to take into account that - according to 
its intrinsic nature - propaganda is considered to be most perfect when it influences 
unconsciously and when the target swallows it without realising that it is propaganda. As 
soon as the target talks about the ‘influence’ of propaganda on himself it has failed in its 
intended purpose (‘black’ propaganda was intended to work in this way and to appeal to the 
emotions of the Germans).237 This twofold, and somewhat contradictory, way in which 
propaganda can influence its target makes it very difficult to assess its effectiveness. 
Before examining the impact of propaganda on Germany let us consider the effects 
which the organisational arrangements had on its output. As has been shown, the British 
propaganda apparatus was in a chaotic state throughout the whole war and was characterised 
by rivalries among ministers and officials. It was never thoroughly organised, but an element 
of improvisation prevailed throughout the war. The British government never managed to 
establish a department with sole authority for the conduct of political warfare, although this 
was energetically advocated by various ministers and officials. The reasons for this were 
largely political. The organisation and the management of political warfare was therefore 
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less efficient than it might have been. Cruickshank saw this as a great disadvantage for the 
effectiveness of British propaganda.238  
But this improvisational and polycratic structure may in some ways have had a 
positive effect on British propaganda output. Although the BBC had to follow PWE’s 
instructions, its broadcasts to Germany were not subject to a centralised and inflexible 
decision-making process, but were solely the responsibility of the Regional Editors. This left 
the propagandists with much greater freedom to make ‘good’ propaganda. The same applied 
to ‘black’ propaganda. Delmer was able to establish his own more or less independent 
propaganda empire at Woburn, although this development had not been foreseen by those 
responsible for organising propaganda at the outbreak of war. Thanks to his personal 
contacts with the Secret Intelligence world, he was able to launch one of the most 
sophisticated propaganda operations of the Second World War.  
An objective evaluation of the impact of British propaganda on the German audience 
is almost impossible, although there is a large amount of evidence from various sources. But 
the documented reaction has to be treated with great care, since most of it does not 
constitute an objective testimony but is subjective, exaggerated or not representative of the 
whole German population. 
First of all we do not possess any reliable numbers of the German listeners during the 
war, neither for the BBC nor for the ‘black’ stations. It is known that the number was small 
at the beginning and increased as the war turned to the disadvantage of the Germans. From 
late 1942 and early 1943 onwards, after the disastrous defeats in North Africa and at 
Stalingrad, more and more Germans began to listen to the BBC. The number of those who 
listened to the BBC and to black stations increased further after the Allied invasion of 
France. A Gestapo report of 1941, which reached the BBC in 1943, estimated the BBC’s 
audience at about 1 million. By the autumn of 1944 it was estimated to be between 10 and 
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15 millions. Further evidence that British propaganda was listened to are the sentences 
imposed on Germans for Feindhören (listening to enemy stations), which were regularly 
published in the German press as a warning to the population. But they do not provide 
evidence for the actual numbers of listeners.239 
What motivated so many Germans to listen to British radio stations though it was for-
bidden, and to risk their freedom and lives? On the one hand there were those who were op-
posed to the regime from the beginning and seized every opportunity to get uncensored 
information. Others were motivated by curiosity because they were increasingly feeling that 
the whole truth was being withheld by their own radio and press. This was openly admitted 
in reports of the Sicherheitsdienst which stated that many Germans listened to foreign 
stations because they reported events that where not reported on the German news services. 
Hess’ flight to Britain, the Allied landing in Crete and the German invasion in Russia were 
such events which made many Germans feel uninformed about the actual facts.240 
Technical circumstances have also to be borne in mind when assessing the number of 
listeners. It is unknown how many Germans were in fact able to receive short or medium 
wave transmissions on their radios. The ‘black’ stations broadcast exclusively on short wave 
and used medium waves only from 1943 for the Soldatensender Calais, whereas the BBC 
used both short and medium waves from the beginning. But most of the German households 
were equipped with the so-called Volksempfänger, a simple radio unable to receive short and 
medium waves, which was deliberately sold cheaply by the Nazis to make listening to 
foreign stations impossible.241 
It is tempting to measure the extent to which British propaganda was actually capable 
of influencing the German audience by the reactions of the German authorities. But these of-
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ficial responses have to be treated with great caution, since they do not prove a considerable 
effect of British propaganda on the German population. For one must not necessarily 
conclude that the more the authorities reacted the more successful the propaganda was. 
Although official reactions seem to be the most obvious form of evidence, they are also the 
most controversial, since propagandists tend to exaggerate the influence of propaganda on 
the ordinary human being.242  
Despite these deficiencies PWE took great care to evaluate the responses of the Nazis. 
It derived its information about the attitudes of the Nazi government towards British propa-
ganda from the German press and radio and from smuggled or captured documents. That the 
Nazis feared the influence of foreign propaganda is shown by the intensity with which the 
authorities devoted themselves to monitoring and analysing British broadcasts and by the 
measures taken against those who listened to them. As early as on 1 September 1939 a law 
was passed which made listening to foreign stations a crime, and heavy sentences were im-
posed on those who broke the law. The dissemination of information was even more 
severely punished.243 Heavy jamming of ‘enemy’ broadcasts, often at the expense of the 
audibility of German home radio, also indicated as how dangerous the Nazis regarded the 
content of British broadcasts on the morale of the German masses.244 The Nazis also devoted 
a great extent of their home propaganda to denying and answering ‘the lies from London’, 
often without revealing the source. The BBC thus managed at least to break the Propaganda 
Ministry’s monopoly over German ears and to force it into a continuous ‘dialogue’. German 
propaganda went more and more on to the defensive and tried to deny point by point the 
news items broadcast on the BBC and on ‘black’ stations’. The most famous example is 
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Sefton Delmer on the BBC and Hans Fritzsche on the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft, who 
fought a regular battle on the ether.245 
However, when PWE evaluated the impact of propaganda on the Germans, it did not 
restrict itself to these official reactions, but tried to explore all other available sources. From 
the beginning of the war Germans imprisoned by the British were systematically 
interrogated about their attitude towards British propaganda. But these testimonies often do 
not give a true picture of the impact of propaganda either, because many answers were given 
in order to please the captors. Furthermore, the men chosen for examination were not 
necessarily typical of the mass of the German armed forces.246 But despite these deficiencies 
the minutes of the interrogations give some idea of the extent to which British broadcasts 
were listened to. At the end of the war more than half of the prisoners, particularly those 
serving in the Luftwaffe and on U-boats, admitted to having listened to Atlantik/Calais, and 
many had also listened to Gustav Siegfried Eins.247 
The most difficult task is to measure the influence of British propaganda on the 
German civilian population. Between May and December 1945 the BBC Listener Research 
Unit received and analysed more than 10,000 letters from individual German listeners which 
came from all strata of society. According to these letters the principal motive for listening 
was the wish to learn the truth and the real situation of the war, which were hidden by 
German propaganda.248 Of course, these letters do not represent an objective evaluation of 
the BBC’s impact on the German population either, and many letters were exaggerated ‘fan-
mail’ for particular BBC speakers. But yet they give an impression of what the BBC meant 
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to a certain number of households in Germany.249 One has to bear in mind, however, that 
these letters were sent by a small minority of Germans who were mostly critical of the 
regime from the beginning. They do not say anything about the millions of other Germans 
who did not write and express their opinion of the BBC. 
It is no easier a task to evaluate the specific impact of the ‘black’ stations. Numerous 
campaigns of Gustav Siegfried Eins and Atlantik/Calais had their effects on the German sol-
diers and civilians and often caused the authorities to deny rumours which had been spread 
by these stations without revealing the source.250 A Bavarian Sicherheitsdienst report of 
1944, which reached PWE, stated that since October 1943 frequent references were made by 
the population to the Soldatensender. According to the report the station caused great unrest 
and confusion by news concerning the situation at the fronts and at home. The station 
enjoyed great popularity because of its news service, and was widely trusted because its 
reports turned out to be more or less correct.251 
Ultimately, bare listener numbers, official reactions, letters or interrogations of 
prisoners of war do not reveal much about the actual impact that propaganda had on its audi-
ence. What they show, in the first instance, is that British stations enjoyed a great popularity 
during the war. There is very little evidence to show what effect propaganda was having on 
those who did listen. Yet it is very unlikely that anybody who firmly supported the regime 
would have tuned in to the BBC. The case might be somewhat different with the ‘black’ sta-
tions, which pretended to be German (and thus provided a good excuse for those who 
listened) and which were popular among soldiers because they provided entertainment. 
Listening to British propaganda was one thing; however, acting upon it another. From the 
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evidence available it seems that both ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda failed in their intended 
purpose of demoralising the German people, of driving a wedge between the Nazi clique and 
the population and of making it act or rise against its Nazi leadership. There is no proof that 
anyone was induced to join resistance groups because of having listened to the BBC or that 
German morale was seriously damaged.252 
There are two possible causes for this failure. On the one hand, we have always to 
bear in mind the special circumstances which prevailed in totalitarian Germany. Even if 
some people were inclined to do something, it was nearly impossible to translate this 
inclination to action without risking their lives and those of their relatives and friends. 
Society was regulated from top to bottom and spies were everywhere. Even if one had 
wanted to, there would have been little scope for the individual to act. On the other hand, we 
have to take into account that the ultimate goal of British propaganda - to induce the German 
people to free itself from Nazi terror - was counteracted by the Allied decision at the 
Casablanca Conference in 1943 to beat Germany militarily until her unconditional 
surrender. British propaganda could offer no guaranteed reward for a successful overthrow 
of the Nazi government. This rendered the propagandists’ call for German resistance to the 
Nazi regime implausible and in the end useless.253 
If one tries to summarise what has been said so far about the impact of propaganda, it 
must be admitted that propaganda, whether ‘white’ or ‘black’, did not win the war and it was 
powerless against military defeat. This was clearly demonstrated by German domestic 
propaganda. The British propaganda effort would have counted for little if the war had not 
turned in favour of the Allies. The proposition that British propaganda contributed to the de-
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feat of Germany must therefore be denied.254 Thus the fears so widely expressed after the 
First World War that propaganda was a powerful weapon and capable of defeating the 
enemy on the home front did not come true.  
The view which was prevailing in Britain at the beginning of the war proved to be in-
correct. Neither did political warfare play a major part in an Allied victory nor could it be 
taken ‘for granted [...] that Germany could be defeated on the Home Front even while the 
armies were still winning victories [...]’, as Vernon Bartlett wrote in 1938 on the basis of an 
enquiry into public opinion in Germany.255 This over-optimistic tone gave way to a more 
realistic estimation of the potential of propaganda as the war progressed. In 1944 a PWE 
memorandum stated more humbly that ‘our hope was to produce decisive political results by 
propaganda. [...] To hope for such a movement [by the people against the Nazis] as a result 
of our political warfare is unrealistic.’256 The experiences of World War II thus destroyed 
much of the myth of propaganda that had arisen after the First World War. 
But the realisation of the limits of propaganda and the Allied demand for 
‘unconditional surrender’ did not render it useless, for its purpose clearly went beyond 
short-term war aims. Britain did not only seek a military victory over Germany, but also 
sought to lay the foundations for a stable post-war order in which she was going to play a 
major role. Propaganda, therefore, contributed to the creation this new political order and to 
the re-education of the German population. Those who listened to the BBC had already 
started with this process of rethinking.257 
On the principle that publicity, if it is to be effective, must support the 
policy-makers and not try to force their hands, the logical implication of the 
Casablanca decision for the propagandists was that, instead of trying to 
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accelerate surrender, they should concentrate on influencing the post-surrender 
situation.258 
Finally, British propaganda did not only exploit the potential for a description of the 
post-war treatment of Germany, it also played a vital role in giving hope and comfort to 
many Germans during the war. Even though the aim of British propaganda to separate the 
German population from its authorities and to destroy the will to fight on was not achieved, 
the BBC could provide many Germans with what they were desperately longing for: with 
truthful news and the ardent hope that the Nazi regime would fall, which was a comfort to 
those opposed  to Hitler. The success of the BBC lay in the fact that it always tried to do 
something more than demoralise its audience: to give hope for a better post-war world.259 
What the BBC meant to many Germans from various backgrounds during the war was 
expressed in many letters addressed to the BBC after the war: ‘That you also brought us hu-
mour [...] - all that made the unbearable bearable for us.’ ‘You on the other side of the Chan-
nel spoke a language which some of us could understand, a language filled with hope and 
warm humanity. The BBC was - and is today - a real source of light for us.’ ‘Your 
broadcasts meant more to me than simply news. They were the only window into that world 
in which people can speak, act and think freely.’ ‘Again and again I have admired the high 
level of your “propaganda“ and the quiet objectivity of your talks. If it had not been for 
Lindlay Fraser, Hugh Carlton Green, Charles Richardson, Peter Petersen and all the other 
ambassadors of truth, we should have been suffocated by Hitler’s propaganda of lies. [...] If 
I had to decide on the award of the Nobel peace prize I should give it to those responsible 
for the German programmes of the BBC.’260  
For this achievement, at least, the vast effort of British propaganda was worth while. 
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